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Abstract 
Power systems are undergoing a profound transformation towards cyber-physical systems. 
Disruptive changes due to energy system transition and the complexity of the interconnected 
systems expose the power system to new, unknown and unpredictable risks. To identify the 
critical points, a vulnerability assessment was conducted, involving experts from power as well 
as information and communication technologies (ICT) sectors. Weaknesses were identified 
e.g., the lack of policy enforcement worsened by the unreadiness of involved actors. The 
complex dynamics of ICT makes it infeasible to keep a complete inventory of potential 
stressors to define appropriate preparation and prevention mechanisms. Therefore, we 
suggest applying a resilience management approach to increase the resilience of the system. 
It aims at a better ride through failures rather than building higher walls. We conclude that 
building resilience in cyber-physical power systems is feasible and helps in preparing for the 
unexpected. 
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1 Introduction 
Power systems are evolving through an increasing convergence with information and 
communication technologies (ICT), leading to complex cyber-physical power system (CPPS). 
This has brought opportunities to enhance the systems’ performance and provide solutions to 
cope with the associated challenges of energy supply based on distributed and fluctuating 
renewable energies. However, at the same time this extended interconnection and 
interdependency between the electric power and ICT infrastructures expose the power system 
to new, unknown and unpredictable risks. 
Cyber-attacks targeting power systems have been growing in number and sophistication in 
recent years. The cyber-attack on the Ukraine power grid in December 2015, where energy-
grid operations were disrupted by unknown cyber actors causing blackouts for over 225,000 
customers (Styzcynski and Beach-Westmoreland, 2017). One year later, in December 2016, 
a transmission level substation in Ukraine was impacted by a malware framework identified 
as ‘Crashoverride’, resulting in outages for an unspecified number of customers (Dragos Inc., 
2017). These were the first reported attacks of its kind, but cyber-attacks on power systems 
have been presumed in other cases in recent years. For instance, between 2016 and 2018, 
access was gained to the control rooms of United States power suppliers by Russian hackers, 
which could have enabled them to shut down networks and cause blackouts (Cellan-Jones, 
2018). In this case, the attackers won access by staging malware and by spear phishing 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2018). Although the connection between the attack and 
actual blackouts in the US power grid was not clear, this caused the Department of Homeland 
Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation to create detection and prevention guidelines 
against such activities. Another incident was reported on March 5, 2019. An electric utility in 
the western United States was disrupted due to a denial-of-service incident. This attack did 
not cause a blackout or harm to power generation and it is not clear if the Western 
transmission grid was an intentional target. But it did lead to a loss of visibility to certain parts 
of the utility's supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and therefore was 
placed in a concerning category (Sobczak, 2019). 
Vulnerability and risk assessments are seen as a crucial measure when it comes to power 
system cybersecurity, see (Arghandeh et al., 2016; NIST, 2014; Rossebo et al., 2017; Teixeira 
et al., 2015), since the identification of known vulnerabilities and their influence on the security 
of the system enables the development of methods to deal with the vulnerabilities. In these 
studies, potential impacts and mitigation options were evaluated based on lists of potential 
threats and their likelihood of occurrence. 
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We argue that due to the dynamic nature of ICT and its complex interdependency with the 
power infrastructure, we have to expect surprises. It will no longer be possible to identify a 
comprehensive inventory of potential threats, as is the case in classic risk management. A 
reliable power supply is of great importance for almost all areas of life, therefore it is necessary 
to develop strategies that enable the power system to be prepared for expected and 
unexpected stressors. In other words, it is essential to apply a resilience management 
strategy. Many definitions of resilience exist in the scientific community (e.g., (Jesse et al., 
2019)). For this study, we describe resilience as a (socio-technical) system’s ability to maintain 
its services under stress and in turbulent conditions (Brand et al., 2017; von Gleich et al., 
2010). The advantage of using this definition is that it focusses on the system services, which 
must be outlined together with the stakeholders/users. In this way, changes and evolutions of 
the system are possible, which are core aspects of transitions. The focus lies on the complex 
nature of interconnectedness and interdependency, and the capability of the system to 
maintain its services. 
This manuscript presents the results of two work packages1 of the research project Strom-
Resilienz that focused on the vulnerability and resilience of the digitalization of power systems. 
It was developed by the Resilient Energy Systems research group at the University of Bremen 
in cooperation with the Institute for Ecological Economy Research (Institut für ökologische 
Wirtschaftsforschung, IÖW), from September 2015 to November 2017. 
The main objectives of the mentioned work packages were to identify which additional 
vulnerabilities could arise from the digitalization of power systems and what are the required 
strategies to increase the resilience of power systems to ensure that the system’s primary 
functionality is maintained, even under stress. The study was structured in two parts. First, a 
vulnerability assessment (VA) was performed to identify the critical properties, structures and 
elements that make the system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. For this purpose, an 
interdisciplinary approach involving energy sector stakeholders and ICT solution providers 
through interviews and workshops was selected. Second, a resilience strategy was developed 
by using a resilient management approach to identify how cyber-physical systems can be 
better prepared for any stressor. 
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows: the executive summary in section 2 
highlights the important aspects about the applied methods and main results. Section 3 
provides a brief theoretical background regarding concepts of vulnerability and resilience, and 
describes in detail the applied methodologies for the vulnerability assessment and the 
 
1 Working package 2: Determination and analysis of possible disturbance events and concretization of 
resilience criteria, and working package 3: Identification of options to minimize vulnerability and 
maximize resilience 
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resilience management strategy. Section 4 discusses the results of the vulnerability 
assessment. In section 5, the results of the resilience management strategy are discussed. 
Section 6 ends the manuscript with conclusions and outlook. 
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2 Executive Summary 
Note: This section is the preprint version of the work (Tapia et al., 2020) already published in 
TATuP Vol 29 No 1 (2020): Cybersecurity. Threat, vulnerability, values, and damage. See 
final version in https://doi.org/10.14512/tatup.29.1.23. 
Introduction 
Power systems are evolving through an extended convergence with information and 
communication technologies (ICT), leading to complex cyber-physical power systems 
(CPPS). This has brought opportunities to enhance the systems’ performance and provide 
solutions to cope with the associated challenges of energy supply based on distributed and 
fluctuating renewable energies. However, cyber-attacks targeting power systems have been 
growing in number and sophistication in recent years. For instance, the attacks against the 
Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 2016 that resulted in power outages (Dragos Inc., 2017). 
Another incident against a utility in the United States was reported on March 2019 (Sobczak, 
2019). Several risk and vulnerability assessments for power systems have been published in 
recent years e.g., (NIST, 2014; Rossebo et al., 2017). In these studies, potential impacts and 
mitigation options were evaluated based on lists of potential threats and their likelihood of 
occurrence. We argue that due to the dynamic nature of ICT and its complex interdependency 
with the power infrastructure, we have to expect surprises. It will no longer be possible to 
identify a comprehensive inventory of potential threats, as is the case in classic risk 
management. 
A reliable power supply is of great importance for almost all areas of life, therefore it is 
necessary to develop strategies that enable the power system to be prepared for expected 
and unexpected stressors. In other words, it is essential to apply a resilience management 
strategy. Many definitions of resilience exist in the scientific community e.g., (Jesse et al., 
2019). For this study, we describe resilience as a (socio-technical) system’s ability to maintain 
its services under stress and in turbulent conditions (Brand et al., 2017; von Gleich et al., 
2010). The advantage of using this definition is that it focusses on the system services, which 
must be outlined together with the stakeholders/users. In this way, changes and evolutions of 
the system are possible, which are core aspects of transitions. The focus lies on the complex 
nature of interconnectedness and interdependency, and the capability of the system to 
maintain its services. 
This article presents the results of an empirical and interdisciplinary base study that involved 
actors from energy and ICT sectors through interviews and workshops, to get better insights 
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into the vulnerabilities of CPPS. The study consists of two parts. First, a vulnerability 
assessment (VA) was performed to identify critical points coming from the ICT infrastructure. 
Second, a resilience strategy was developed by using a resilience management approach to 
identify how CPPS can be better prepared for any stressor. 
Methodology 
Vulnerability Assessment Approach 
The event-based and structural VA methods (Fig. 1) carried out in (Gößling-Reisemann et al., 
2013; von Gleich et al., 2010) were used as reference for this study. 
 
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the VA methodology. Left: Event-based VA. Right: Structural VA. Source: Authors’ own compilation 
based on (Gößling-Reisemann et al., 2013; von Gleich et al., 2010) 
 
The potential impacts were evaluated based on their effect on the system services, which 
were defined in this case according to parameters for both the electric and ICT infrastructures. 
Regarding the electric infrastructure, the quantity criteria are determined by the system’s 
ability to supply the connected load. The quality criteria are defined by direct technical 
parameters, such as power quality or reliability indices, and by indirect parameters, such as 
socio-economic and socio-ecological impacts. Regarding the ICT infrastructure, the approach 
considers the effect on the security requirements, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
non-repudiation of data in transit or at rest (e.g., control commands, firmware, software, etc.). 
The study focused on the German and European power system covering the complete 
electrical energy conversion chain and was limited to evaluate stressors from the ICT 
infrastructure. The component layer of the Smart Grid Architecture Model2 was used as a 
reference architecture model. Two workshops and 19 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with experts from the sectors: energy, industrial automation, ICT, and public bodies 
in the time period between June 2016 to March 2017. The expert statements were evaluated 
 
2 http://smartgridstandardsmap.com/ 
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by means of a comprehensive qualitative content analysis methodology based on (Mayring, 
2014). 
Combining the experts’ opinions, relevant literature, and our own judgement, the potential 
impacts were qualitatively rated as high, medium or low according to the effects of stressors 
and structural weaknesses on the quality and quantity criteria of the system services. In order 
to determine the adaptive capacity, inputs from experts and literature were considered 
regarding existing or foreseen adaptation mechanisms and the readiness of the concerned 
actors to implement them. They were also qualitatively rated as high, medium or low. 
Consequently, the vulnerability level was the result of combining potential impacts and 
adaptive capacity according to the matrix showed in Fig. 2.  
 
Fig. 2: Vulnerability assessment matrix that considers the level of potential impacts on systems services and adaptive capacity. (H: High, M: 
Medium, L: Low). Source: Authors’ own compilation based on (Gößling-Reisemann et al., 2013; von Gleich et al., 2010) 
Resilience Management Approach 
Resilient CPPS should have a diverse set of capabilities such as resistance/robustness, 
adaptation, innovation and improvisation to overcome known and unknown stressors. They 
help the systems to maintain their system services (see definition above). In this study the 
resilience management approach described in (Acatech et al., 2017; Goessling-Reisemann 
and Thier, 2019) was used as a reference. It comprises a four-phase approach: (1) Prepare 
and prevent, (2) Implement robust and precautionary design, (3) Manage and recover from 
crises, and (4) Learn for the future. The suggested measures for each step were developed 
based on: the VA results, the resilience design principles/elements described in (Brand et al., 
2017; Goessling-Reisemann and Thier, 2019), the statements of the interviewed experts, and 
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Fig. 3: Four phases of the resilient management approach scheme and the sources for determining the suggested measures for each 
phase. Source: Authors’ own compilation based on (Acatech et al., 2017; Goessling-Reisemann and Thier, 2019) 
Vulnerability Assessment Results 
The VA identified critical properties, structures and elements contributing to the vulnerability 
of the CPPS. Based on the qualitative content analysis results, the findings were sorted into 
the following four categories: (a) technology, (b) organizational security policies and 
procedures, (c) the human factor, and (d) regulations. Each category included subcategories 
and they were assessed individually using the VA methodology described above. All 
subcategories resulted in high vulnerability ratings following the combination of medium to 
high potential impacts with medium or low adaptive capacities (Tab. 1). The list of categories 
and subcategories is not intended to be comprehensive. However, it reflects the fact that the 
interviewees were queried about what the critical points are according to their opinion, which 
led to a list of high vulnerabilities. In the following section the findings for each category will 
briefly be described. 
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Tab. 1: Categories and subcategories that reflect critical properties, structures and elements of CPPS and the corresponding ratings of 
Potential Impacts, Adaptive Capacity and Vulnerability on the scale L: Low, M: Medium, H: High. Source: Authors’ own compilation 
Technology 
The increased number of systems, endpoints and actors involved in the CPPS leads to a 
higher number of interconnections and communications. If these communications use 
unencrypted or weakly encrypted network protocols, authentication keys and data payload are 
exposed (NIST 2014). Using Man-in-the-Middle attacks, threat agents will be able to listen, 
inject or manipulate messages between nodes. From one side, legacy communication 
protocols used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) in the generation, transmission and 
distribution domains have evolved from proprietary point-to-point links and isolated from 
external networks to open and standard protocols. According to the experts this represents a 
high security problem. The ‘Crashoverride’ malware, which seems to have been used in the 
Ukraine blackout in 2016, is a good illustration of an advanced malware that leverages the 
weaknesses of certain ICS protocols (Dragos Inc., 2017). From the other side, experts also 
stated that the more distributed and closer to the end-consumer, the communication occurs, 
the more vulnerable it gets. The reason is that devices located at the customer premises (e.g., 
Internet-of-Things devices) are deployed with poor security features and furthermore, they are 
not regulated. In most of the cases they do not have capabilities for secure key management, 
control access, or patch management. Security challenges and threats of smart home devices 
are discussed in (Lee et al., 2014). 
Organizational Security Policies and Procedures 
Experts agreed that due to the increasing complexity and interdependencies between IT and 








Insecure endpoints M-H M H




Improper patch management M-H M H





Lack of security awareness in
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M-H M H




Lack of effective implementation of 
standards and regulations
M-H M H
Lack of coordinated effort to improve 
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M-H M H
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challenges has changed. In most of the cases interdisciplinary knowledge is missing or limited, 
and therefore it is difficult to properly understand, design, implement and operate the complete 
complex system. Normally, OT assets are maintained by ICS operators and engineers rather 
than experienced IT professionals, which can result in common mistakes in maintenance, 
configuration, and lack of hardening (Bodungen et al., 2017). Moreover, typical IT systems 
security measures cannot be directly applied in ICS environments, because the process 
stability or availability could be affected. Therefore, specific and tailored security measures 
are needed. 
As experts stated, ICS usually tend to be outdated, either because vendors do not provide 
security patches or because the particular system is time-critical. As a consequence, attackers 
are able to gain access to different system components by exploiting known security-gaps that 
have not yet been patched. Nevertheless, even if all patches and mitigations are kept up-to-
date, attacks are becoming more sophisticated and adversaries use unknown zero-day 
exploits (McLaughlin et al., 2015b). 
The Human Factor 
The lack of effective security trainings and awareness programs in power sector organizations 
can lead to insufficiently trained or engaged personnel in cyber-security aspects (NIST, 2014). 
Applying social engineering, threat agents are exploring new attack mechanisms targeting 
different levels in the organization. This is one of the fastest growing security problems 
according to the experts. In the Ukrainian blackout in 2015, attackers developed the 
Blackenergy 3 tool malware and performed a phishing campaign targeting employees from 
the electricity distributor (Styzcynski and Beach-Westmoreland, 2017). 
Disgruntled employees, or ex-employees, who are not properly managed when leaving the 
company may represent further potential threat actors. They could have detailed knowledge 
of the systems and access to critical data, allowing them to identify weak internal structures 
and methods to compromise the systems. Furthermore, critical information about the system 
configuration could even be publicly available through vendors’ or asset owners’ websites, 
employees’ social media sites, etc. Attackers can leverage this information for planning the 
attack. 
Additionally, experts mentioned also that end users represent another vulnerable point 
because of their lack of awareness or understanding of the consequences of eventually low 
security of their smart devices. A more complex problem derives from end-users being 
prosumers, who may not have the expert-knowledge to implement and maintain appropriate 
security measures for Distributed Energy Resource (DER) systems (e.g., smart inverters). 
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Regulations 
The lack of an effective implementation of security standards and regulations represents 
another critical point for CPPS. Experts considered that the absence of mandatory regulations 
to enforce power system operators to implement minimum required security standards, or 
vendors to provide the necessary security requirements in their products expose the system 
to possible cyber-attacks, for instance man-in-the-middle attacks on non-upgraded ICS 
systems running the IEC 60870-5 protocol (Maynard et al., 2014). 
Different technical and organizational standards have been developed to address cyber-
security requirements in smart grids (ENISA, 2012; NIST, 2014). Nevertheless, as experts 
stated, in most of the cases, these are only recommendations and the compliance to a 
minimum security level is not enforced by regulations. Furthermore, the experts mentioned 
that there are no economic incentives for grid operators to invest in cyber-security 
enhancements. The decision to upgrade legacy ICS in order to implement the security 
measures could be delayed until the next planned lifecycle equipment replacement, not only 
because of the processes’ criticality, but due to the additional associated costs. Another critical 
point, as experts remarked, is the missing effective coordination to improve security for the 
overall system.  
The critical points discussed in this section are related to all categories mentioned above. The 
relationship is seen as lack of readiness of the involved actors to implement existing 
adaptation strategies. Thus, increasing the vulnerability level of each category itself. 
Resilience management strategy 
The VA unveiled the critical vulnerable points. Security measures, if applied, have great 
potential to reduce some vulnerabilities. However, they focus mainly on trying to keep the 
malicious attackers outside of the system. Therefore, one of the biggest challenges is to find 
a way to broaden the horizon in handling known and unknown stressors by including 
recovering, adapting and learning mechanism after successful attacks, instead of only 
focusing on prevention and detection. This is the objective of the second part of the study. Our 
main concern is how to increase the resilience in CPPS. This requires understanding that 
resilience is more than just eliminating identified vulnerabilities. The applied resilience 
management approach consists of four phases (Fig. 3). 
During the preparation and prevention phase, weak points in the CPPS are identified and 
effective prevention measures must be derived. The focus here is on known stressors, thus a 
holistic security approach between IT-OT (IEC, 2016), and energy-focused risk analysis and 
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management strategies (Fischer et al., 2018) are needed. Experts also stress the importance 
of scalable and regularly tested security measures at endpoints (e.g., encryption, 
authentication, authorization, intrusion detection systems), patch management, network 
segmentation, as well as more effective and engaging security trainings and awareness 
programs. Technology-wise the implementation of additional measures for data storage and 
preserving unused resources - operational slack - to better deal with surprises are helpful 
(Fischer and Lehnhoff, 2019). 
In order to enhance resilience, a robust and precautionary system design should be 
implemented from the beginning. This will empower the system to maintain its services even 
under stress or disturbances. The system should have a high diversity of IT components and 
redundancy in communication channels and devices (BNetzA, 2019). Maintaining the ability 
to rely only on physical parameters for operation as well as hardware-based security are 
helpful. Furthermore, implementing a cellular structure in order to secure a minimum and 
stable power supply in case of a failing central ICT infrastructure appears beneficial (VDE, 
2015). Other suggestions supported by the experts are the implementation of real-time 
monitoring, intrusion and bad data detection (Iturbe et al., 2016; McCarthy et al., 2018), as 
well as periodic backups, and reducing services and functionalities in terms of data, ports, 
libraries, etc. (Fischer and Lehnhoff, 2019). 
A resilient power system is able to ride through failures in order to manage and recover from 
crises. While the stability and security in this phase could be enhanced by multi-agent based 
control with decentral consensus finding (Lehnhoff and Krause, 2013), attention should also 
be paid to the ability to operate the system without ICT, i.e. manually, or to at least secure a 
soft landing, as experts stated. In addition, the provision of business continuity and emergency 
plans on a regional and local level, e.g., through supplying islands at least in and around public 
properties/buildings, and the preparation for active emergency planning and exercises based 
on realistic cyber-attacks have a high priority (Arghandeh et al., 2016). 
Past and avoided disasters should be used in phase four to learn for the future in order to 
improve the adaptive capacity of the system. In this sense, digital forensic would allow to 
investigate incidents and near incidents in-depth and identify lessons. This should include the 
documentation of weaknesses that led to failures (Vulnerability store) (Gößling-Reisemann, 
2016). Furthermore, strengths that avoided crises in the past or enhanced recovery are 
equally worth identifying, as they form the basis for planning strategies and emergency 
scenarios (Solution store) (Gößling-Reisemann, 2016). This documentation must be 
mandatory and publicly available.  
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Fig. 4 shows the summary of selected resilience-enhancing measures and elements for each 
phase of the resilience management approach. 
 
Fig. 4: Selection of resilience-enhancing measures and elements, sorted by the categories: Technology (blue), Organizational Security 
Policies and Procedures (green), the Human Factor (orange) and Regulations (grey), according to the Resilient Management approach 
phases. Source: Authors’ own compilation  
Conclusions 
In this study, critical properties, structures and elements contributing to the vulnerability of 
CPPS were identified. On one side, insecure communications or insecure end points, 
especially at the customer premises, resulted in a high vulnerability due to poor security 
features on the devices. On the other side, social engineering is a quickly growing security 
problem that enables threat agents to exploit one of the weaknesses present in every 
organization: the human factor. In spite of the existence of adaptation mechanisms that could 
minimize the impact, it was found that their implementation could be hindered by the lack of 
policy enforcement or the unreadiness of the involved actors to implement these measures. 
To address cybersecurity challenges, an integrated assessment considering physical, cyber 
and social perspectives is necessary. The aim is not only to try to keep attackers outside the 
system, but to design the system in a way that enables it to transform and adapt in order to 
cope with any kind of stressor. In other words, a resilience management strategy is needed, 
that considers that resilience is more than just eliminating identified vulnerabilities. This article 
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illustrated resilience enhancing measures assigned to the four phases of the resilience 
management cycle. One important measure is to establish an adequate cyber security 
regulation framework and monitor its effective implementation. Regarding the system 
architecture, a cellular structure and physical backup would build resilience in case of 
successful attacks. We conclude that introducing resilience principles/elements to the system 
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3 Methodology 
The main objectives of the above-mentioned work packages of the Strom-Resilienz research 
project were to identify which additional vulnerabilities could arise from the digitalization of 
power systems and what would be the required strategies to increase the resilience of power 
systems to ensure that the system’s primary functionality is maintained, even under stress. 
In order to answer those questions, the study was performed in two parts. First, a vulnerability 
assessment (VA) was performed to identify the critical properties, structures and elements 
that make the system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. For this purpose, an interdisciplinary 
approach involving energy sector stakeholders and ICT solution providers through interviews 
and workshops was selected. Second, a resilience strategy was developed by using a 
resilience management approach to identify how cyber-physical systems can be better 
prepared for any stressor. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 describe the methodologies used in each part 
respectively. 
3.1 Vulnerability Assessment Methodology  
Two vulnerability assessment methodologies namely event-based vulnerability assessment 
(EVA) and structural vulnerability assessment (SVA), carried out during the study of climate 
change vulnerabilities of the energy systems in Northwest Germany (Gößling-Reisemann et 
al., 2013; von Gleich et al., 2010), were used as the reference for the assessment in this study. 
The selected methodological framework considers the vulnerability not only as a function of 
the system’s exposure, the sensitivity of the system to external/internal stressors and the 
potential impacts on the power system services, but also considers the system’s ability to cope 
with them. This ability identified as adaptive capacity, is based on existing or planned 
adaptation strategies and the willingness of the concerned actors to implement these 
measures (Gößling-Reisemann et al., 2013). Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the scheme of EVA 
and SVA methodologies. 
It is worth mentioning that in the IT security field, the term ‘vulnerability’ commonly refers to a 
weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or 
implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source (NIST, 2014). This 
definition differs from the one used in our VA methodologies as it only represents the system’s 
exposure to a stressor, without considering the adaptation measures. 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of Event-based vulnerability assessment (EVA) methodology. Own 
representation based on (Gößling-Reisemann et al., 2013; von Gleich et al., 2010) 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of structural vulnerability assessment (SVA) methodology. Own 
representation based on (Gößling-Reisemann et al., 2013; von Gleich et al., 2010) 
The potential impacts were evaluated based on their effect on the system’s services, which 
were defined according to specific parameters for both the power and ICT infrastructures (see 
Table 1). 
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Table 1. Definition of system services for cyber-physical power system that considers criteria for the power 
infrastructure and the ICT infrastructure. Source: Authors’ own compilation based on (Gößling-Reisemann et al., 
2013; von Gleich et al., 2010) 
 
Regarding the power infrastructure, the quantitative criteria were determined by the system’s 
ability to supply the connected load (Gößling-Reisemann et al., 2013). The qualitative criteria 
were defined by direct technical parameters, such as: power quality or reliability indices, and 
by indirect parameters, such as: environmental impacts, economic impacts (e.g., effects on 
Power Infrastructure 
Quantitative Criteria:  
Delivery of power 
Qualitative Criteria 
Direct Technical Parameters Indirect Parameters 
• Power quality:  
▪ Voltage level (e.g., 400 V +/-10%) 
▪ Frequency (e.g., 50 +/- 0.2 Hz) 
• Environmental impacts: e.g., 
▪ CO2 Emissions 
▪ Land / Resources use 
▪ Waste production 
• Reliability indices: e.g.,  
▪ SAIDI (System Average Interruption 
Duration Index) 
• Economic impacts: e.g., 
▪ Costs/Market price effects 
▪ Competitiveness 
 • Social impacts: e.g., 
▪ Compromising customer privacy  
▪ Jeopardizing technology acceptance 
Information and Communication Infrastructure 
Data in transit or at rest, such as: 
• Customer ID and location data 
• Meter data 
• Control commands 
• Configuration data 
• Time, clock settings 
• Access control policies 
• Firmware, Software and Drivers 
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the energy market, billing inaccuracy) and social impacts (e.g., jeopardizing technology 
acceptance or invasion of customer privacy). 
Regarding the ICT infrastructure, the approach considers the effect on the security 
requirements, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation of data in transit or 
at rest (e.g., control commands, configuration data, firmware, software, meter data, etc.). The 
following is a short description of the security requirements (Cleveland, 2016): 
• Confidentiality: preventing the unauthorized access to information 
• Integrity: preventing the unauthorized modification or theft of information 
• Availability: preventing the denial of service and ensuring authorized access to 
information 
• Non-Repudiation: preventing the denial of an action that took place or the claim of an 
action that did not take place  
 
3.1.1 Vulnerability assessment rating 
Combining the experts’ opinions (see sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 below), relevant literature and 
our own judgement the potential impacts on systems services were qualitatively rated as 
enumerated below, according to the effects of stressors and structural weaknesses on the 
quality and quantity criteria of the system services:  
▪ High, if the quantitative criteria of power supply would be affected substantially, 
▪ Medium, if the quantitative criteria were not affected substantially, but if the 
compromised security requirement could have a direct effect on the quantitative 
criteria, or at least one of the qualitative criteria parameters would be affected 
substantially, 
▪ Low, if neither the quantitative nor qualitative criteria of power supply would be 
affected substantially, or if the compromised security requirement could only have an 
indirect effect on the qualitative or quantitative criteria. 
In order to determine the adaptive capacity, inputs from experts and literature were considered 
regarding existing or foreseen adaptation mechanisms and the readiness of the concerned 
actors to implement them. They were also qualitatively rated as: 
▪ High, if both an adaptation mechanism to avoid the potential impacts and the 
willingness to adapt were given. 
▪ Medium, if either an adaptation mechanism to avoid the potential impacts or the 
willingness to adapt was given. 
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▪ Low, if neither an adaptation mechanism to avoid the potential impacts nor the 
willingness to adapt was given 
Consequently, the vulnerability level was evaluated as the result of combining potential 
impacts and adaptive capacity according to the matrix showed in Figure 3. A high adaptive 
capacity prevents or mitigates the potential impact resulting in a vulnerability level that is one 
level below the potential impact level, except for the case when the potential impact is already 
low. A medium adaptive capacity does not change the potential impact. However, a low 
adaptive capacity increases the vulnerability one level above the potential impact level, based 
on the hypotheses that under these circumstances weak stressors can go unnoticed (and 
unanswered) for a long time, leading to accumulating impacts on system service (Gößling-
Reisemann et al., 2013).  
The measures to improve adaptation capacity have great potential to not only reduce 
vulnerability but to also increase the resilience of the systems. Therefore, the results from the 
vulnerability assessment were used as a starting point to identify the resilience strategy. 
 
 
Figure 3 Vulnerability assessment matrix that considers the level of potential impacts on systems services and 
adaptive capacity. (H: High, M: Medium, L: Low). Source: Authors’ own compilation based on (Gößling-
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3.1.2 Reference architecture model 
This study was focused on the German and European power system covering the complete 
electrical energy conversion chain. As a reference architecture model, the component layer of 
the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI Smart Grid Coordination 
Group, 2012) used by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in the Smart Grid 
Standards Mapping Tool (IEC, 2020) was used. Figure 4 shows the reference architecture 
model used for the VA and Figure 5 shows a simplified view of the SGAM plane.  
 
Figure 4 Reference architecture model used for the vulnerability assessment. Source: (IEC, 2020)  
The SGAM model consists of five consistent layers representing business objectives and 
processes, functions, information models, communications protocols and components. Each 
layer covers the smart grid plane which is spanned by smart grid domains and zones. The 
SGAM model represents not only the current state of implementations in the electrical grid but 
furthermore, it represents the evolution to future smart grid scenarios by supporting the 
principles universality, localization, consistency, flexibility and interoperability (CEN-
CENELEC-ETSI Smart Grid Coordination Group, 2012). These characteristics allowed us to 
use this reference architecture model as material for the expert interviews and workshops to 
discuss about cyber security of power systems assuming a complete implementation of the 
smart grid functionalities.  
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Figure 5 Smart Grid Plane. Source: (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI Smart Grid Coordination Group, 2012) 
This study covered the different smart grid domains: generation, transmission, distribution, 
distributed energy resources (DER), customer premises, and smart grid zones: process, field, 
station, operation, enterprise and market according to the SGAM architecture (see Figure 5. 
The following is an overview of each SGAM domain, zone and layer (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 
Smart Grid Coordination Group, 2012):  
SGAM Domains: 
Bulk Generation Representing generation of electrical energy in bulk 
quantities, such as by fossil, nuclear and hydro power plants, 
off-shore wind farms, large scale photovoltaic (PV) power– 
typically connected to the transmission system 
Transmission Representing the infrastructure and organization which 
transports electricity over long distances 
Distribution Representing the infrastructure and organization which 
distributes electricity to customers 
DER Representing distributed electrical resources, directly 
connected to the public distribution grid, applying small-scale 
power generation technologies (typically in the range of 3 kW 
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to 10.000 kW). These distributed electrical resources can be 
directly controlled by DSO 
Customer 
Premises 
Hosting both - end users of electricity, also producers of 
electricity. The premises include industrial, commercial and 
home facilities (e.g., chemical plants, airports, harbors, 
shopping centers, homes). Also generation in form of e.g., 
photovoltaic generation, electric vehicles storage, batteries, 
micro turbines are hosted 
 
SGAM Zones: 
Process Including both - primary equipment of the power system (e.g., 
generators, transformers, circuit breakers, overhead lines, 
cables, electrical loads …) - as well as physical energy 
conversion (electricity, solar, heat, water, wind …). 
Field Including equipment to protect, control and monitor the 
process of the power system, e.g., protection relays, bay 
controller, any kind of intelligent electronic devices (IED) 
which acquire and use processed data from the power 
system. 
Station Representing the aggregation level for fields, e.g., for data 
concentration, substation automation… 
Operation Hosting power system control operation in the respective 
domain, e.g., distribution management systems (DMS), 
energy management systems (EMS) in generation and 
transmission systems, micro-grid management systems, 
virtual power plant management systems (aggregating 
several DER), electric vehicle (EV) fleet charging 
management systems. 
Enterprise Includes commercial and organizational processes, services 
and infrastructures for enterprises (utilities, service providers, 
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energy traders …), e.g., asset management, staff training, 
customer relation management, billing and procurement. 
Market Reflecting the market operations possible along the energy 





Business Represents business cases which describe and justify a 
perceived business need 
Function Represents use cases including logical functions or services 
independent from physical implementations 
Information Represents information objects or data models required to 
fulfill functions and to be exchanged by communication 
Communication Represents protocols and mechanisms for the exchange of 
information between components 
Component Represents physical components which host functions, 
information and communication means 
 
3.1.3 Expert workshops  
Two workshops were conducted in June 2016 and March 2017 with experts from ICT and 
energy sector both from industry and academia to discuss about vulnerability and resilience 
of cyber-physical power systems.  
3.1.3.1 First Expert Workshop 
During the first workshop, the VA methodology approach described above was used in a 
limited version. For this exercise, a set of cyber security failure scenarios developed by the 
U.S. National Electric Sector Cyber-security Organization Resource (NESCOR) Technical 
Working Group 1 (NESCOR, 2015) was used as the starting point for the discussion. The 
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mentioned document describes for each of the failure scenarios, the relevant vulnerabilities3, 
impacts and mitigation strategies. Potential impacts included power loss, equipment damage, 
human casualties, revenue loss, violations of customer privacy and loss of public confidence.  
Small working groups in the workshop were organized according to the different domains of 
the power sector. Each group discussed at least one NESCOR failure scenario, in order to 
identify the stressors, the exposure and the sensitivity of the system under pre-described 
conditions. The feasibility of putting these conditions into practice was also discussed. 
Furthermore, the groups discussed about current adaptation mechanisms to prevent the 
occurrence of the scenarios and/or restore service after the failure. The NESCOR scenarios 
analyzed were: 
• “Threat agent causes of grid instability through control of dedicated data and voice 
lines between system operating center and plant (GEN.10)” 
• “Switched capacitor banks are manipulated to degrade power quality (DGM.10)” 
• “DER systems shut down by spoofed SCADA control commands (DER.14)” 
• “Mass meter remote disconnect by authorized individual (AMI.1)” 
• “Unauthorized pricing information impacts utility revenue (AMI.10)” 
The results from the workshop provided us with valuable insights about some of the main 
cyber-security challenges that needs to be addressed as a result of the increased complexity 
of ICT system in the different domains of the power system.  
3.1.3.2 Second Expert Workshops 
In the second expert workshop, the preliminary results of the VA were presented and 
discussed with the participants. Based on the results from the discussions, the VA and the 
resilience strategy were concretized. The major focus was on the granularity of the energy 
system, but technical, organizational and regulatory measures to increase resilience were also 
discussed. 
3.1.4 Expert interviews 
In order to gain more profound knowledge for the vulnerability assessment, almost 100 experts 
from ICT and energy field were contacted for this study, out of which 19 participated in a 
personal or telephone semi-structured interview from October 2016 to March 2017. The 
interviewees were divided according to their field of expertise into five categories as listed in 
Figure 6.  
 
3 The term vulnerability from the NESCOR document is understood as weakness/exposure in our 
methodology. 
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During the interviews, the experts were inquired about cyber-vulnerability of current and 
envisioned power systems, potential impacts on the power systems services and possible 
adaptive strategies to cope, adapt or recover from them. The list of questions used in the 
interviews can be found in Appendix A: Interview Analysis Methodology. 
 
Figure 6 Categories according the field of expertise of the interviewees and number of participants 
3.1.5 Qualitative content analysis 
The statements from the expert workshops and interviews were evaluated by means of a 
comprehensive qualitative content analysis methodology based on (Mayring, 2014) and used 
as input information for the VA.  
Due to the fact that some of the interviewed experts asked to remain anonymous, for the 
interview analysis it was decided to use ‘Interviewee X’ as the participant identification for all 
of the interviewees, where X represent the sequential number according to the time when the 
interview took place. This identification will be used in the following sections to reference the 
statements from the interviewees. 
More detailed information of the qualitative content analysis can be found in Appendix A: 
Interview Analysis Methodology. 
3.2 Resilience Management Approach 
In the last decade the concept of resilience has grown in popularity and multiple definitions 
are used by the research community (see (Jesse et al., 2019)). We describe resilience as a 
(socio-technical) system’s ability to maintain its services under stress and in turbulent 
conditions (Brand et al., 2017; von Gleich et al., 2010). The advantage of using this definition 
is that it focuses on the system services, which must be outlined together with the stakeholders 
and/or users. In this way, changes and evolutions of the system are possible, which are core 
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aspects of transitions. The focus lies on the complex nature of interconnectedness and 
interdependency, and the capability of the system to maintain its services. 
Resilience can also be interpreted as the capacity of the system to prepare for, cope with and 
recover from any stressor, while maintaining the system’s services without necessarily 
knowing beforehand about the specifics of the event or the stressor (Gößling-Reisemann, 
2016). Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish certain characteristics of stressors and the 
capabilities that a resilient system should possess in order to deal with them. Stressors can 
be characterized by their dynamics and the state of knowledge about their nature, as follows 
(Gößling-Reisemann, 2016):  
• Known/expected: stressors that the system has already experienced in the past and 
where predictions of future occurrences exist 
• Unknown/unexpected: stressors that the system has never or only very rarely been 
exposed to and where predictions for future occurrences do not exist 
• Gradual/creeping: stressors that develop slowly and possibly undetected for some 
time 
• Abrupt/sudden: stressors that develop suddenly or abruptly without warning 
A system that is capable of preparing for, coping with and recovering from stressors with an 
arbitrary combination of the above-described attributes needs a diverse set of capabilities that 
can be summarized as robustness, adaptive capacity, innovation capacity and improvisation 
capacity (See Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 Assignment of the required abilities of a system to be prepared for different stressors. The stressors are 
differentiated according to time of occurrence and degree of awareness. Source:(Gößling-Reisemann, 2016) 
When stressors develop gradually and are already known to the system or can be expected 
to occur in the near future, an adaptation of existing structures, components and organizations 
can be initiated to better cope with and recover from occurrences of this stressor. On the other 
extreme, when the stressor is unknown and develops abruptly, actors in the system will not 
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have time to find innovative solutions or build up resistance, thus they will have to improvise 
(Gößling-Reisemann, 2016). 
The focus of the second part of the study was to investigate how to develop resilience within 
the CPPS and related organizations. For this purpose, the above definition of resilience was 
used as a guiding principle and the resilience management approach described in (Acatech 
et al., 2017; Goessling-Reisemann and Thier, 2019) was used as a reference. 
This approach comprises four phases: (1) Prepare and prevent, (2) Implement robust and 
precautionary design, (3) Manage and recover from crises, and (4) Learn for the future, which 
will be briefly described in the following section. The suggested measures for each step were 
developed based on the VA results, the resilience design principles/elements described in 
(Brand et al., 2017; Goessling-Reisemann and Thier, 2019), the statements of the interviewed 
experts, and our own judgments (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 Resilient management approach scheme showing the four phases and the sources for determining the 
suggested measures for each phase. Source: Own representation based on (Acatech et al., 2017; Goessling-
Reisemann and Thier, 2019) 
3.2.1 Preparation and Prevention 
During preparation and prevention phase, weak points in the system need to be identified 
and effective preventive measures and guidelines must be derived from the results (Acatech 
et al., 2017). Past crises and near accidents should be transparently documented and 
examined to learn about the stressors that caused them and the context in which they 
occurred, or in which they were avoided, respectively (Gößling-Reisemann, 2016). Further 
analysis should be directed at stressors that have not yet occurred, but are likely to occur in 
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the near future, e.g., known from trend extrapolation. Furthermore, new threats can stem from 
social processes, for example: increasing non-acceptance of certain technologies or unfair 
cost-benefit distributions in the context of energy transitions leading to protests and delays or 
halts in necessary system changes. Newly developing stressors can be analyzed by 
vulnerability assessment methodologies. Results from these assessments should then be 
used to adjust the design parameters of energy system components (technology level), 
develop testing scenarios and design guidelines for coupled infrastructures (system level) and 
monitor social impacts and responses to technological change with feedback to governance 
processes (governance level) (Gößling-Reisemann, 2016). 
3.2.2 Implementation of a robust and precautionary system design 
The second phase of building resilience focuses on the implementation of a robust and 
precautionary system design to withstand any kind of stressor. In line with the above 
detailed characteristic capabilities of resilient systems, the central design elements of resilient 
energy systems must comprise robustness, adaptive capacity, innovation capacity and 
improvisation capacity. On the design level of components and systems, the resilience-
enhancing capabilities can be achieved by first strengthening the identified vulnerable 
elements (see Preparation and Prevention phase) by increasing redundancy, buffer capacity 
and energy storage. This will reduce the stress on vulnerable elements in the system and will 
also act as a precautionary measure for further and yet unknown stressors (Gößling-
Reisemann, 2016). In order to prepare for unknown future stressors, principles and elements 
that enhance the resilience of the system should be implemented in the system. 
The principles and elements that are summarized in Figure 9 are derived from a search on 
design principles and elements with known resilience-enhancing features, e.g., taken from the 
knowledge of evolutionary processes in ecosystems or socio-technical resilience in energy 
systems, organizations and other application fields. A brief description of selected elements 
is given below, a more detailed analysis can be found in (Brand et al., 2017). 
Diversity contributes positively in the way that a system can respond to stressors. In order to 
make the concept of diversity more operational and potentially measurable, Stirling suggests 
to specify diversity in terms of disparity, variety and balance (Stirling, 2007). Disparity is 
understood as the differences between system elements. Variety characterises the amount or 
number of different elements with the same functionality in the system. Balance is given by 
the distribution (mix) of these different elements (Goessling-Reisemann and Thier, 2019). It is 
also advisable to check existing technologies in the energy system for alternative solutions to 
enhance diversity. 
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Redundancy describes the multiple availability of elements in a system, either in number or 
in functional equivalence. These multiple elements are usually not needed in normal 
operation. Numerical redundancy is understood as the provision of a number of identical 
elements with the same function, while functional redundancy refers to the situation where the 
same function is delivered by distinctly different elements (e.g., by different technologies, 
operating systems, etc.) (Goessling-Reisemann and Thier, 2019). 
Geographical dispersion plays an important role for resilience. By spreading system 
elements geographically, all localized stressors, from weather related events to terrorist 
attacks, have a relatively smaller attack surface (Goessling-Reisemann and Thier, 2019). 
Distributing system-critical services over a wider geographical range thus enhances resilience.  
The implementation of buffer and storages in systems will enable the system to maintain its 
services in case of internal or external resource restrictions. Buffer and storages provide the 
system with extra capacities that delay critical system states after a disrupted supply. These 
elements thus serve several functions that enhances a system’s resilience; they decouple 
sub-systems or infrastructures from each other, ensuring functioning of system even after 
connections have been severed, they also buy extra time for the system’s recovery and 
facilitate the recovery process by itself. If implemented locally, they can help in maintaining a 
minimum service to a larger number of system users in times of crisis (see (Lovins and Lovins, 
2001) for illustrations in electricity grids) Delivering backup power from batteries in cases of 
disrupted transmission grids is one example (Goessling-Reisemann and Thier, 2019).  
A system that can be divided and split into sub-segments is called modular/cellular, if the 
aggregated elements provide full system function in the sub-segments (Goessling-Reisemann 
and Thier, 2019). Modularity is considered to enhance reparability and lower outage times in 
technical systems, but it also allows for an enhanced diversity if modules are equipped with 
well-defined interfaces so as to ease swapping different technological implementations 
(Huang and Kusiak, 1998) cited in (Goessling-Reisemann and Thier, 2019). 
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Figure 9 Overview of principles and elements that enhance the resilience of systems. Source: (Goessling-
Reisemann and Thier, 2019) 
3.2.3 Manage and recover 
If failures of the energy system led to crises, they should be restricted to the smallest possible 
area or sub-system and be overcome as quickly as possible. To reduce the extent of such 
crises, emergency planning and respective measures must be implemented on the regional 
or local level. With the increasing share of renewable energies comes a trend towards 
decentralization of energy systems, which can be utilized for increased resilience (Gößling-
Reisemann, 2016). 
3.2.4 Learn for the future 
Past disasters and avoided disasters should be used to learn for the future and thus improve 
the adaptive capacity of the system. This can be achieved by documenting and analyzing 
these crises and events thereby identifying the weaknesses that led to their occurrence 
(vulnerability store), or, respectively, identify the strengths that led to their avoidance or 
recovery (solution store). Knowledge about crises and potential solutions should then be used 
to create simulations and business games for system actors on all levels. Improvisation 
capacity can be increased by confronting actors in these simulations with unforeseen and 
unlikely developments, like combined external threats and internal failures of equipment 
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4 Vulnerability Assessment Results 
The VA identify a wide range of critical properties, structures and elements coming from the 
ICT infrastructure that contribute to the vulnerability of CPPS. Based on the qualitative content 
analysis results, the findings were sorted into four categories and subcategories as shown in 
Table 2.  








and procedures  
Improper patch management 
Lack of interdisciplinary IT-OT 
knowledge 
The human Factor 
Lack of security awareness in 
organizations 
Lack of security awareness among 
consumers 
Regulations 
Lack of effective implementation of 
standards and regulations 
Lack of coordinated effort to improve 
security 
 
The vulnerability of each subcategory was assessed individually using the VA methodology 
described in 3.1 and the results will be explained in the following sections. 
4.1 Technology 
4.1.1  Insecure communications 
Increasing the number of systems, services and actors involved in the cyber-physical power 
system means that higher number of interconnections are required. Since power systems 
use nearly the same TCP/IP based communication technology used in business IT 
networks, its related cyber-security problems also affects power systems (Interviewee 1, 
personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 6, personal communication, 2016). However, 
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security requirements are not the same as in business and industrial networks. 
Confidentiality is an important aspect of standard IT because of the secrecy associated 
with companies’ information, but hardly a priority in industrial control systems (ICS), where 
integrity and availability of data is vital to keep systems running (Marin Fernandes, 2012).  
If the communications use unencrypted or weakly encrypted network protocols, 
authentication keys and data payload are exposed. Using clear text protocols may also 
enable adversaries to perform session hijacking and Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, 
allowing the attacker to manipulate the data being passed between devices (NIST, 2014). 
While some connections may be more secure than others, the weakest link can be used 
as an attack vector into other domains due to the highly interconnected nature of the cyber-
physical power systems (Knapp, 2011).  
In order to assess the vulnerability due to insecure communications, the SGAM domains 
of the power system (see Figure 4) were grouped in three clusters: (a) consumption, (b) 
distributed energy resources and distribution, (c) generation and transmission. 
4.1.1.1 Exposure and sensitivity 
a. Consumption  
In the case of smart meter infrastructure, the majority of the experts mentioned that 
Germany has a strong encryption communication scheme based on the IT security 
architecture and security requirements defined by the German Federal Office for 
Information security (BSI) in their Smart Meter Gateway Protection Profile (see (BSI, 
2014)). 
According to this security architecture, depicted in Figure 10, the central communication 
component is a Smart Meter Gateway (SMGW) that is located at customer premises 
and connects the electronic measuring equipment in the Local Metrological Network 
(LMN), as well as any controllable consumption, storage, or production devices in the 
Home Area Network (HAN) with the various market participants (e.g., Smart Meter 
Gateway Administrator (SMGA) on behalf of the metering point operator, distribution 
system operator or energy supplier) in the Wide Area Network (WAN) (BSI, 2015a). 
The SMGW collects, processes and stores the records from meter(s) and ensures that 
only authorized parties have access to them. Relevant information is signed and 
encrypted before being sent, using the cryptographic services of a Security Module, 
which is embedded as an integral part into the SMGW. The Protection Profile (PP) 
defines the security objectives and corresponding security requirements for a Security 
Module that is utilized by the Gateway for cryptographic support (BSI, 2014)). To ensure 
the interoperability of the various components in the smart metering infrastructure, BSI 
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defined technical implementation guidelines that can be found in the Technical 
Guideline TR-03109, see (BSI, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 10 Smart Meter Gateway Architecture. Source: (BSI, 2015a) 
Despite the fact that this communication scheme aims at ensuring data protection, data 
security and interoperability, some experts also mentioned that it presents some 
drawbacks. The scheme is already some years old and the main purpose is to encrypt 
only the communication between the SMGW and the SMGA. The security requirements 
for the communication between the SMGW and other actors, i.e. the external market is 
not regulated in the SMGA certification process, which could imply a potential security 
gap that could compromise the security requirements of smart metering data 
(Interviewee 8, personal communication, 2017; Interviewee 19, personal 
communication, 2017). 
An evaluation of the PP and their related technical implementation guidelines were 
performed by von Oheimb, D. in (von Oheimb, 2012) and several drawbacks were 
pointed out. It was mentioned that the security scheme required heavy protection 
mechanism only for SMGW that implies high technical overhead as well as high 
involved costs for implementation, certification and use. Furthermore, regarding the 
encryption scheme, the study mentioned that the use of a classical Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) introduces very critical central points of failure, where exploiting any 
weakness may cause enormous damage to the overall system. This was confirmed by 
an IT security interviewee, who mentioned that using public key cryptography in the 
energy sector, power systems would essentially inherit problems of public key 
cryptography that are currently affecting online security, like websites. Essentially, the 
problems lie in the overhead for maintaining a PKI, namely, the certificate authorities 
and key management (Interviewee 13, personal communication, 2017). 
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Inside the customer’s premises, communication protocols used in home or building 
automation systems (e.g., automated lighting systems, surveillance systems, smart 
appliances, and other IoT devices.) could represent another entry point for potential 
data breaches, mainly because some of these protocols are insecure-by-design and 
not addressed in current regulations. One example of this weakness can be found in 
the work done by Morgner et al. in (Morgner et al., 2017). They performed a security 
analysis of the network protocol ZigBee Light Link (ZLL), one of the most popular 
standards used by lighting systems intended for residential, commercial, and industrial 
buildings. The analysis was targeted at the ZLL touchlink commissioning procedure that 
is used for integrating ZLL devices through close proximity instead of cryptographic 
authentication. The results showed that the touchlink communication relies on 
communications frames, which are neither secured nor authenticated. Furthermore, the 
transport of the network key to a joining device is protected solely by a global master 
key, which was leaked in March 2015 and cannot be renewed due to the backward 
compatibility demands towards legacy ZigBee Light Link products (Morgner et al., 
2017). ZigBee is a popular standard for wireless low-power communication 
implemented in several Internet of Things (IoT) devices for other applications that 
includes door locks and intrusion alarm systems, adding more insecure entry points 
that could compromise security requirements of data inside the HAN. 
b. Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and Distribution 
The growing penetration of distributed energy resources has made the grid more 
dynamic and complex (Arghandeh et al., 2016), increasing significantly the number of 
devices (e.g., smart inverters, battery controllers) that are owned and controlled by 
consumers and third-parties (Qi et al., 2016).  
At the local level, DER systems manage their own generation and storage activities 
autonomously based on local conditions, pre-established settings, and DER owner 
preferences. However, DER systems are active participants in grid operations and need 
to be coordinated with other DER systems and distribution grid devices (IEC, 2016). In 
the work developed by Qi, J., et al. (Qi et al., 2016), a DER system architecture 
clustered in four domains was proposed that depicts the different actors and 
interactions (see Figure 11) used for the analysis of cyber-security for DER and smart 
inverters.  
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Figure 11 Generic architecture of power systems with DER. Source: (Qi et al., 2016) 
The following are some critical points related to insecure communication mentioned by 
the authors (Qi et al., 2016):  
• Domain 1: DER devices and controllers: The DER owners get the information 
about the DER by communicating with smart inverters with insecure wireless 
communication protocols such as ZigBee. 
• Domain 2: Distribution utility communications and control: The utility interacts 
with the smart inverters and controllers using communication protocols such as 
smart energy profile (SEP) 2.0, that should be checked for vulnerabilities. 
• Domain 3: Third Parties: Most of the third-party entities have the ability to 
monitor the status of DER, and some may also have the ability to directly control 
their operation. Furthermore, these entities may have connectivity to a very 
large number of DER. These interconnections introduce centralized points that 
could potentially be leveraged by attackers to manipulate and influence a large 
number of DER across multiple distribution grids.  
• Domain 4: Transmission Operation: DER operations need to be integrated with 
the large power grid operations. Communication protocols used for this purpose 
include Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) and IEC 61850, which are 
insecure by design and security improvements could not always be 
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implemented (see section 4.4.1 Lack of effective implementation of security 
standards and regulations). 
As mentioned by one interviewee from the energy and market sector, the 
communication infrastructure for DER is partially regulated and external actors such as: 
manufacturers (e.g., PV inverters or wind turbine manufacturers) or direct marketers 
can access the controllers of distributed generation units in order to get information for 
monitoring and controlling purposes. Problems could arise because these actors have 
their own communication infrastructure to the generation units which could be insecure 
and be a back door to access the system (Interviewee 2, personal communication, 
2016). 
c. Generation and Transmission 
Communication protocols in ICS and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) Systems have evolved over time from proprietary point-to-point links to open 
and standard protocols used across distributed systems (McLaughlin et al., 2015). In 
the beginning, the communication infrastructure of power systems was generally 
secure because it was isolated from external communication networks (the so called 
‘air-gap’). Additionally, they were based on custom proprietary hardware and software 
which conferred them a reasonable level of ‘security by obscurity’ (Teixeira et al., 2015). 
However, the extended convergence with ICT networks and the dominant 
communication based on TCP/IP protocols represent a high security problem for the 
power systems (Interviewee 2, personal communication, 2016). 
Legacy ICS communication protocols were designed without cyber-security in mind 
therefore, they do not have IT security mechanisms implemented such as encryption 
or authentication (Interviewee 15, personal communication, 2017). For instance, 
Modbus is a simple client-server protocol that was originally designed for low-speed 
serial communication in ICS networks. Given that the Modbus protocol was not 
designed for highly security-critical environments, Modbus packages are sent 
unencrypted, therefore it could be easy for an attacker to link to a legitimate network 
node and manipulate the message that will not be recognized by the receiver 
(Interviewee 15, personal communication, 2017; Mo et al., 2012), compromising 
measurement values or control commands which could lead to system malfunction. 
Furthermore, industrial control networks in some cases are connected directly to the 
internet without proper security measures in place thus enabling the access for external 
threat agents who could infect the industrial networks with viruses or malware 
(Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 15, personal 
Vulnerability and resilience of cyber-physical power systems. Results from an empirical-based study 
 
Tapia, Mariela; Thier, Pablo; Gößling-Reisemann, Stefan Page 49 
 
communication, 2017). Search engines such as SHODAN4 can be used to easily find 
internet facing ICS devices. Furthermore, open source and commercial tools for 
exploiting well-known ICS protocol weaknesses can be easily found on the internet, 
exposing even more of these systems to potential attacks.   
At the station zone from the SGAM model (see section 3.1.2), some sensors or 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) use wireless communication, which in general tend 
to be more insecure because of weak protocols, lack of encryption methods or improper 
device configuration. However, to compromise these devices physical proximity is 
required, which could be limited for external threat agents inside industrial 
environments (Interviewee 15, personal communication, 2017). There could be an 
attack scenario where the initial point of intrusion is located at the substation through 
wireless devices and spread towards the electrical system operations. If this is not 
accounted for, it could represent a serious risk (Interviewee 18, personal 
communication, 2017). 
Most of the manufacturers have remote service interfaces for inspection and monitoring 
of larger components, e.g., a power turbine. Remote access can also get into the 
controller level or Human Machine Interface (HMI) level for installing updates or 
patches. If the connection is not properly secured, this remote access could allow 
access into the system device or further for malicious purposes. Grid operators can 
also implement remote connections to different devices, e.g., substations equipment, 
in order to install updates or patches. For this purpose, dedicated communication 
networks can be used, especially by big operators, but other small operators could use 
networks leased by telecommunication operators or through the internet. In the latter 
cases, if the security polices for the communication infrastructure are not properly 
implemented, data security requirements could be compromised (Interviewee 4, 
personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 17, personal communication, 2017). 
4.1.1.2 Attack mechanisms and stressors 
Lack of encryption and authentication implemented for communication protocols enable 
threat agents to use MITM attacks to perform different actions, such as: a) record 
communication between nodes and replay packets in order to hide real system 
behavior without detailed knowledge about the system, b) hijack sessions, when a 
communication session is taken over by the attacker and used for unauthorized 
 
4 https://ics-radar.shodan.io 
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communication with the victim, or c) inject or manipulate data to alter reading and 
commands in the communication stream in real time (McLaughlin et al., 2015). 
In the following section some attack mechanisms and stressors against communication 
infrastructure at different domain clusters will be described: 
a. Consumption  
Sniffing and eavesdropping attacks can be used by remote or local threat agents to 
compromise the confidentiality and integrity of privacy-relevant data or billing-relevant 
data. Remote attackers located in the WAN (see Figure 10) could try to compromise a 
component of the local infrastructure to cause damage to a component itself or to 
produce a direct impact on the power grid, e.g., producing grid instability through data 
manipulation of the smart inverters. Local attackers, including prosumers who have 
access to the gateway and/or meters, could try to read out or alter assets without 
authorization while stored or transmitted in the LMN (see Figure 10) (von Oheimb, 
2012). 
Denial of Service attacks targeting availability of network devices inside the HAN could 
be done by physical attacks on the communication infrastructure. Wired communication 
can be affected by ‘cutting the wires’ and wireless communications can be jammed 
(McLaughlin et al., 2015). Jamming attack consist of sensing the channels until a 
communication is intercepted, then overwhelming the channel with illegitimate traffic 
could be used to affect data availability (Tazi and Abdi, 2015). This kind of attack could 
be used to prevent meters from connecting with the utility company through stuffing the 
wireless media with noise. The channel will always be seen as busy by carriers and 
data packets will be prevented from being received (Baig and Amoudi, 2013) cited in 
(Lopez et al., 2015).  
Morgner and colleagues (Morgner et al., 2017) developed a real-world attack to 
eavesdrop and packet injection attacks against the wireless communication of ZigBee 
devices that are commonly used in the smart home domain. The evaluation showed 
that the protocol security gaps enable the threat agents to compromise the availability 
of the devices and gain control over all nodes in the network.   
b. Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and Distribution 
Utilities, DER manufacturers or third-party aggregators may need to remotely 
communicate with DER in order to control the operating points and monitor the status 
of the devices, which is critical to maintain the reliability of the distribution grid. If the 
communication is not encrypted or uses insecure network protocols, these weaknesses 
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could enable threat agents to perform MITM attacks to deny, disrupt, or change the 
messages. If these attacks occur, they could provide the attacker with the ability to 
control a large number of DER systems which could produce a serious impact on the 
distribution grid (Qi et al., 2016). 
c. Generation and Transmission  
The lack of encryption and authentication of many industrial control protocols leaves 
the system exposed to a range of attacks. For instance, through MITM attacks, a threat 
agent can intercept communication frames and collect unencrypted plaintext frames 
that could provide valuable information, such as: source and destination addresses as 
well as control and settings information (Mo et al., 2012). The attacker can inject or alter 
readings and commands in the communication stream in real time. While intercepting 
all packets, some packets can be dropped, altered or new packets can be injected with 
arbitrary outcome. This attack is very problematic if executed by an experienced user, 
as it is hard to detect and can potentially have a significant effect. An attacker is able 
to manipulate measurement values from remote sites as well as to suppress or inject 
control commands between two communicating nodes (McLaughlin et al., 2015). 
Protocol specific attacks can be found in the literature. For instance, possible attacks 
such as: message spoofing, replay attacks, network scanning, and others related to 
targeting Modbus security issues are detailed in (Mo et al., 2012). Open-source or 
commercial tools for performing MITM attacks on Modbus networks can also be easily 
found on the internet5 (Bodungen et al., 2017). Regarding protocols used for power 
substation automation, several authors cover the use of DoS attacks on networks 
running the IEC 60870-5 protocol (Dondossola et al., 2008, 2009) and others present 
a MITM attack on ICS relying on the IEC 60870-5-104 (Maynard et al., 2014). 
The malware known as ‘Crashoverride’ (aka ‘Industroyer’) is a real illustration of an 
advanced and sophisticated piece of malware that combines multiple attack 
mechanism and leverages the weaknesses of certain industrial protocols used for 
power substation automation. In Box 1 detail information of this malware is given. 
  
 
5 Modbus-VCR (see https://github.com/reidmefirst/modbus-vcr) is an example of a freely available tool 
that in conjunction with Ettercap, will record Modbus traffic and then replay that traffic so systems 
appear to be operating as usual for a recorded time period 
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Box 1: ‘Crashoverride’ malware 
In June 2017, security researchers form ESET and Dragos released a detailed 
analysis of this malware that was developed to target ICS components. According to 
the authors, it is very probable that ‘Crashoverride’ could have been used to impact 
a transmission level substation in Ukraine in December 2016 causing power outages 
(See: (Cherepanov, 2017; Dragos Inc., 2017)).  
Threat actors behind the ‘Crashoverride’ malware showed a deep knowledge and 
understanding of industrial control systems used in power systems and targeted 
industrial communication protocols which were designed some decades ago without 
security in mind. Therefore, the attackers “didn’t need to be looking for protocol 
vulnerabilities; all they needed was to teach the malware “to speak” those protocols” 
(Cherepanov and Lipovsky, 2017). 
 
Figure 12 Simplified schematic of ‘Crashoverride/Industroyer’ components. Source 
(Cherepanov and Lipovsky, 2017)  
The ‘Crashoverride’ malware is a modular framework that is capable of controlling 
power substation switches and circuit breakers directly. Figure 12 shows the 
malware’s structure that consists of a main backdoor, an additional backdoor, a 
loader module and several supporting and payload modules. The backdoor is used 
by the threat agents to install and control the other components. It connects to a 
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remote server (command control center, C&C) in order to receive commands and to 
report to the attackers. The additional backdoor (a ‘trojanized’ version of the Windows 
Notepad application) provides an alternative persistence mechanism that allows the 
attackers to regain access to a targeted network in case the main backdoor is 
detected and/or disabled. The launcher module, which contains a specific time and 
date, loads payload modules and begins an either 1- or 2-hours countdown to launch 
the data wiper component. The payload components target particular industrial 
communication protocols specified in the following standards: IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 
60870-5-104, IEC 61850, and OLE for Process Control Data Access (OPC DA). The 
wiper module is designed to erase system-crucial registry keys and overwrite files to 
make the system unbootable and the recovery harder (Cherepanov, 2017; 
Cherepanov and Lipovsky, 2017; Dragos Inc., 2017). 
Following a brief description of the key feature of each payload module: 
• The 101 payload is named after the international standard IEC 60870-5-101 (aka IEC 
101) that describes a serial communication protocol for monitoring and controlling 
electric power systems used for communication between ICS and Remote Terminal 
Units (RTUs). The 101 payload partly implements the protocol described in IEC 101 
and is capable to read a configuration file to enumerate all the RTUs connected to it. 
The main objective of this payload is to change the on/off state of the underlying RTU 
(Cherepanov, 2017; Virsec, 2017). 
• The 104 payload is a variant of the above 101 payload that runs over a TCP/IP 
network and can discover RTUs in the network. It was named after the international 
standard IEC 60870-5-104 (aka IEC 104). The malware ‘kills’ the original process 
that performs the normal 104 payload monitoring process and replaces it with a rogue 
process. In stage 1, the rogue process connects to the target RTUs and iterates 
through their states. In stage 2, the rogue process continuously flips the on/off state 
of the target RTUs and logs success so that the operators do not receive an alert 
(Virsec, 2017). 
• The 61850 payload is named after the IEC 61850 standard that describes a protocol 
used for multi-vendor communication between devices that perform protection, 
automation, metering, monitoring and control of electrical substation automation 
systems. Once executed, the module leverages a configuration file to identify targets 
and without a configuration file, it enumerates the local network to identify potential 
targets. It communicates with the targets to identify whether the device controls a 
circuit breaker switch. The payload enumerates the data and creates a log with rich 
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meta-data about each target for export to the C&C (Cherepanov, 2017; Dragos Inc., 
2017; Virsec, 2017). 
• The OPC DA payload component implements a client for the protocol described in 
the OPC Data Access specification. OPC (OLE for Process Control) is a software 
standard and specification that is based on Microsoft technologies such as OLE, 
COM, and DCOM. The Data Access (DA) part of the OPC specification allows real-
time data exchange between distributed components, based on a client–server 
model. This payload queries the various OPC Servers it discovers and is looking for 
items provided by OPC servers that belong to solutions from ABB such as their 
MicroSCADA range6. Once executed, the module will send out a 0x01 status which 
for the target systems equates to a “Primary Variable Out of Limits” leading operators 
to misunderstand protective relay status (Cherepanov, 2017; Dragos Inc., 2017; 
Virsec, 2017). 
The additional tools include Denial-Of-Service (DOS) tool that exploit the vulnerability 
CVE-2015-53747 causing the SIPROTEC digital relay from Siemens to fall into an 
unresponsive states until it is rebooted manually (Cherepanov, 2017). 
 
4.1.1.3 Potential impacts 
The use of insecure communication channels will affect the data security requirements. 
In the following section, potential impacts for each domain cluster evaluated in the 
previous section are detailed: 
a. Consumption  
Compromising data confidentiality through MITM attacks is seen as a more relevant 
security issue in the smart metering infrastructure than in the other power system 
domains (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016). The analysis of energy 
consumption data can provide significant insight into the privacy of customers 
(Greveler, 2016). For instance, if a threat agent is able to monitor the power 
consumption that can be directly related to activity patterns inside the customer 
premises, this could have implications on household owners' security. Attackers could 
deduce when the owners are at home in order to perform criminal activities (Interviewee 
13, personal communication, 2017).  
 
6 See: http://new.abb.com/substation-automation/products/software/microscada-pro 
7 See: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01 
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The implementation of demand response schemes could also have privacy 
implications. Demand response requires high frequency measurements of 
consumption and generation, and the availability of flexible loads. If this privacy-
sensitive information gets into the wrong hands, breaching the confidentiality of such 
information would also have privacy implications (Interviewee 18, personal 
communication, 2017). 
A detailed information about the debate around privacy and data protection for the 
Smart Meter security scheme in Germany can be seen in (Greveler, 2016). 
b. Distributed Energy Resources and Distribution 
Compromising communication links to DER systems could provide an attacker with 
access to a large number of DER devices. These impacts maybe minor if the third-party 
access is limited to only monitoring the state of the DER. However, if the third-party has 
the ability to change operational set points or software configurations, then attacks 
against these systems could have serious impacts that may cascade beyond a single 
distribution grid (Qi et al., 2016). 
Some related failure scenarios can be found in the NESCOR catalog (NESCOR, 2015). 
For instance, the scenario DER.6 illustrates the case when a threat agent compromises 
DER sequence of commands, possible through a replay attack, causing grid imbalance 
and power outages. In the scenario DER.14, a threat agent spoofs DER SCADA control 
commands causing power instability, including outages and power quality problems.  
c. Generation and Transmission 
Data injection attacks against SCADA system or intelligent electronic device (IED) 
could cause system disruptions. Rogue protocol commands can be sent to force slave 
devices into inoperable states, shut down services or force resets. Certain commands 
can be broadcasted to multiple devices at once, thus stopping the flow of network traffic 
and resulting in Denial of Service (DoS). In addition, malicious codes can be used to 
erase data from diagnostics (Lopez et al., 2015; Mo et al., 2012). 
In the case of the ‘Crashoverride’ malware that leveraged weaknesses of industrial 
communication protocols, the Dragos team described legitimate attacks and impact 
scenarios that included: de-energized substations and a forced islanding event (Dragos 
Inc., 2017). In the first scenario, malicious control commands are effectively sent to 
open closed breakers in power substations in an infinite loop. If a system operator tries 
to issue a close command on their HMI (Human Machine Interface) the sequence loop 
will continue to re-open the breaker. This loop maintaining open breakers will effectively 
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de-energize the substation line(s) preventing system operators from managing the 
breakers and re-energizing the line(s). The impacts of de-energizing a line or substation 
will depend on the system dynamics, power flows and other variables. In some 
circumstances, it may not have an immediate effect while in others it can produce power 
outages. Furthermore, due to the fact that the control center will lose remote control of 
the breakers, it will be necessary to send a service crew to the substation for manual 
operation. This will imply a few hours of outages. 
In the second scenario, threat agents target one or multiple RTUs and a control 
command is sent to begin a loop that toggles the status of the breaker between open 
and close continuously. Changing the breaker status will invoke automated protective 
operations to isolate the substation that could produce grid instabilities. If multiple 
substations are coordinately compromised the impact will be extended power outages.  
4.1.1.4 Potential impacts rating 
The use of insecure communication channels will compromise integrity and availability 
and non-repudiation requirements, which could have a direct effect on the delivery of 
power. Compromising data confidentiality could have an effect on indirect parameters, 
i.e., public acceptance of smart metering. Therefore, according to the VA methodology, 
the potential impacts range from Medium to High. 
4.1.1.5 Adaptation strategies and implementation  
As interviewees stated, in order to preserve the security of the power system, multiple 
levels of security mechanism should be built on top of each other. First, it is required to 
implement cryptographic methods on data and communication channels in order to 
ensure data integrity and prevent unintended disclosure of information in transit. On top 
of this, the implementation of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is required to have an 
effective visibility on attacker’s activities. (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 
2016; Interviewee 13, personal communication, 2017). The advantage of IDS is that 
they can detect known attacks, there are available databases of patterns and 
signatures of common attacks that can be download. However, the disadvantage is that 
these kind of systems are not able to detect unknown attacks, which will require other 
approaches (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016) 
The use of encryption is not always the appropriate choice and a full understanding of 
the information management capabilities that are lost through the use of encryption 
should be completed before encrypting unnecessarily (NIST, 2014). As experts from IT 
and automation sector mentioned, data encryption on industrial control networks could 
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increase the latency. There are solutions from some vendors for encryption devices to 
be installed before the ICS, e.g., PLC, that encrypt/decrypt the communication. Other 
solutions providers are developing specific devices to provide secure communication 
between their devices. Further solutions should go toward encryption directly on 
industrial controllers. Quantum encryption is a novel solution specially designed to 
achieve confidentiality, but for industrial networks the most important criteria is 
availability, and this solution needs to prove that it does not add extra latency and affect 
the system performance in general (Interviewee 15, personal communication, 2017). In 
the case where it is impractical to encrypt all measurements, it becomes critical to 
detect and isolate the measurements which are under attack. Effective attack isolation 
enables the damage control (e.g., removing attacked measurements for state 
estimation) to be performed in a timely fashion before the attack can lead to any incident 
with significant consequences (Teixeira et al., 2015). 
In the case of legacy ICS communication protocols, there are already standards to 
increase the security. For instance the IEC 62351 set of standards provides security 
improvements for protocols such as IEC 60870-5- 104 and IEC 60870-5-101.However, 
vendors do not implement them and usually provide only basic functionalities, thus 
distribution grid providers will not be able to create a secure environment (Interviewee 
1, personal communication, 2016) (See section 4.4.1 for more information on lack of 
effective implementation of security standards as a vulnerability condition).  
Furthermore, experts from IT and automation sector mentioned that according to their 
experience, customers or companies in the industry sector usually do not want state-
of-the-art technology, but already tested and robust solutions (Interviewee 15, personal 
communication, 2017).   
Since a large part of today’s power grid equipment is old, data encryption can be costly 
to implement because of the required corresponding update of the equipment. 
Therefore, it is important to identify which measurements should be encrypted in order 
to maximize the benefits of the protection resources (Teixeira et al., 2015). 
4.1.1.6 Adaptation capacity rating  
According to the previous section, there are available adaptation mechanisms (e.g., ICS 
security protocols) that improve communication security, however, the readiness to 
implement them could be limited due to preference of ICS owners or related additional 
costs. Therefore, the adaptation capacity is rated as medium. 
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4.1.1.7 Vulnerability rating 
According to the rating assessment of potential impacts in section 4.1.1.4 and adaptation 
capacity in section 4.1.1.6, high potential impacts and medium adaptation capacity results 
in High vulnerability due to insecure communication. 
Figure 13 summaries the vulnerability assessment due to insecure communications. 
 
Figure 13 Summary of vulnerability assessment of cyber-physical power systems due to insecure communications. 
For the assessment the SGAM domains of the power system were grouped in three clusters (a) consumption, (b) 
distributed energy resources (DER) and distribution, (c) generation and transmission. Source: Authors’ own 
representation  
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4.1.2 Insecure endpoints  
In network security an endpoint is any device that is network-enabled. Endpoints at different 
zones and domains from SGAM denote their own challenges. In order to assess the 
vulnerability due to insecure endpoints, the SGAM domains of the power system (see 
Figure 4) were grouped in three clusters: (a) consumption, (b) distributed energy resources, 
(c) generation, transmission and distribution. 
4.1.2.1 Exposure and sensitivity 
a. Consumption  
Endpoints located at the customer premises (see Figure 4) (e.g., home automation 
system, IoT devices mobile phones, laptops) are not regulated by cyber-security 
measures and they are deployed with poor security features. Therefore, if well-known 
vulnerabilities of these devices are exploited, they could be used as malicious entry 
points to conduct further attacks to the power infrastructure. These devices do not have 
security capabilities such as secure key management and secure credential storage. 
Also, there is a problem of authentication because in many cases the devices do not 
have an ID and they do not have good credentials to authenticate. Additionally, there 
are not enough capabilities to address patch and software management of the devices. 
Control access to the network are also limited (Interviewee 5, personal communication, 
2016; Interviewee 14, personal communication, 2017; Interviewee 18, personal 
communication, 2017).  
Furthermore, the lack of software integrity checks or signed software in IoT devices 
makes it easy to upload malware on these devices, from where an attack could be 
launched to perform denial of service attacks (Interviewee 5, personal communication, 
2016). Security challenges and threats of smart home devices are further discussed in 
(Lee et al., 2014). 
If the devices are more distributed, there is also a problem of scalability of 
implementation of security measures to secure them properly, because it is required to 
monitor, maintain and update not only few end-points, but thousands of them 
(Interviewee 5, personal communication, 2016). In this aspect, electro mobility will 
represent a future large attack surface on the customer side (Experten-Workshop 2, 
2017). 
According to the German regulation, smart meters have to comply with very strict 
security conditions which aim to increase the security level of the metering 
infrastructure. However, there are other services or devices equipped with extensive 
Vulnerability and resilience of cyber-physical power systems. Results from an empirical-based study 
 
Tapia, Mariela; Thier, Pablo; Gößling-Reisemann, Stefan Page 60 
 
control possibilities (e.g., smartphones applications), which are not currently regulated 
(Experten-Workshop 2, 2017) 
b. Distributed energy resources 
A more complex problem mentioned by an expert originates from end-users being 
prosumers, i.e., being energy producers, while consuming both self-generated power 
and power delivered by the grid. Previously, in a classic power system generation, 
transmission and distribution systems were operated by companies and treated as 
isolated systems. However, the connection of distributed energy resources systems to 
the grid that are maintained and owned by end-customers is bridging the air gap that 
previously enabled the achievement of a certain level of cyber security. The problem 
arises when these distributed systems are connected to insecure networks or to the 
internet. As a consequence, it has to be assumed that the system would be connected 
to potentially insecure endpoints, therefore conventional security measures such as 
authentication or authorization will not be sufficient (Interviewee 14, personal 
communication, 2017). 
Small scale DER systems do not have mandatory regulations to secure these systems 
therefore representing a potential point for malicious intrusions (Interviewee 2, personal 
communication, 2016). 
c. Generation, Transmission and Distribution 
Endpoints at station and field zones (see Figure 4) are often installed at remote 
installation sites without operation or maintenance personnel in place. Therefore, if end-
devices at these locations do not have proper security measures, a potential attacker 
could have the time to try to compromise the insecure devices (computers or network 
devices), get into the network and launch an attack from there (Interviewee 5, personal 
communication, 2016). 
Even end-points located inside industrial facilities (e.g., power plants, transmission 
substations), which normally are closed locations, could be compromised. Experts on 
IT security for industrial automation mentioned that those points where users can 
interact with the system represent weak points as well, because user or operators could 
modify or manipulate configuration parameters or control commands. RTUs and PLCs 
are prone to this kind of stressors (Interviewee 15, personal communication, 2017). 
Furthermore, remote access capabilities of systems or devices could also represent 
potential malicious intrusion points. As mentioned by an interviewee, remote access is 
not insecure per se, because if there is a secure channel with appropriate measures in 
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place it is possible to detect attacks like eavesdropping or man-in-the-middle. However, 
a problem could arise when one of the end-points is potentially insecure (Interviewee 
14, personal communication, 2017). For example, if laptops infected with a virus or 
malware, or connected simultaneously to insecure networks (e.g., the Internet) are 
used for remote maintenance purposes, these end points could compromise the system 
(Experten-Workshop 1, 2016). 
4.1.2.2 Attack mechanisms and stressors 
If the end device is compromised, the adversary does not need to break the 
cryptography to read or manipulate the data. Different attack mechanisms could be 
performed in the different SGAM domains: 
a. Consumption  
Threat agents could upload malicious codes or malwares to poorly secured automation 
devices at customer’s premises in order to control them and launch denial of service 
attacks against the power system or to other infrastructures such as banking systems 
(Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 5, personal 
communication, 2016). 
Smart meters located at the customer premises can be the object of physical tampering 
attacks, although currently these devices are robust against it. These attacks tend to 
be more specialized, for example side channel attacks to intercept information 
(Interviewee 18, personal communication, 2017). A complementary threat analysis of 
the smart meter gateway was conducted within the research project SPIDER where 
additional threats were discovered, most of them fall into the tampering and denial of 
service, affecting integrity and availability of security aspects, see (Becker, 2013) cited 
in (Detken, Genzel, Hoffmann, et al., 2014). 
b. Distributed Energy Resources  
Another possible attack mechanism can be data manipulation on DER system 
components (Interviewee 2, personal communication, 2016). DER requires a wide 
variety of digital devices to control their operation and provide consumers and utilities 
information about their operation. Most DER include smart inverters and DER 
controllers; others may also include battery controllers and even electric vehicle (EV) 
controllers. If attackers can directly access these systems, they will be able to 
manipulate any of their control functions, or spoof status information to the utilities or 
owners (Qi et al., 2016). 
c. Generation, Transmission and Distribution 
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Some attack mechanisms that could occur against ICS endpoints at station and field 
zones of the power grid mostly are caused by human failure or misconfiguration. 
Intentional manipulation of operational parameters could also happen. Devices with 
wireless interfaces could be another attack vector that could spread towards the electric 
system operations (Interviewee 18, personal communication, 2017). 
USB flash drives that are plugged into the network could also be used as entry point 
for installation of malware (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 
18, personal communication, 2017). During maintenance service (local or remote) 
technicians could establish a connection through private laptop which could be infected 
with viruses or other malware, which could be propagated to the industrial network 
(Experten-Workshop 1, 2016). 
Similar to the attack scenarios at the customer’s premises, poorly secured industrial 
control systems located for example in a power substation connected to internet but 
without a firewall or with one improperly configured could be compromised to be part of 
a botnet campaign, causing denial of service attacks. Another attack scenario could be 
that these industrial control systems are used to break cryptographic keys or for bit-coin 
mining, just like the case of network printers. But this scenario is seen to be unlikely by 
some IT Security experts (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016). 
Data manipulation could be also performed in the upper zones from the SGAM, e.g., 
operation, or enterprise (see Figure 4) against database servers (e.g., SCADA historian 
server), where data is consolidated and approved. Quality bits or the data itself could 
be manipulated and consequently the information displayed in the HMI at the control 
center (e.g., frequency) would be different from what is happening in the field 
(Interviewee 4, personal communication, 2016).  
4.1.2.3 Potential impacts on system services 
a. Consumption  
Compromising IoT devices could be used to do ransomware attacks against users. In 
a future scenario if somebody hacks the smart home environment, the attacker could 
demand a sum of money to release the control of lighting, heating, car battery charging, 
etc. (Interviewee 18, personal communication, 2017). Furthermore, as indirect potential 
impact, public acceptance of new technology could be affected by all security issues 
related to IoT in the consumer world and reported in the media (Interviewee 5, personal 
communication, 2016). 
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Smart meter gateways that are located at the customer’s premise could be manipulated 
to reduce power consumption (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016; 
Interviewee 6, personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 18, personal 
communication, 2017; Interviewee 19, personal communication, 2017). However, this 
would be meaningless when the attacker could only impact a single gateway. For an 
attacker it would be interesting to switch off several gateways at the same time through 
Trojans or other malware to have a bigger impact (Interviewee 19, 2017). A higher 
impact could be achieved if a threat agent is able to compromise the IT infrastructure 
of the smart meter gateway administrator to use the secure communication channel 
and attack millions of gateways that could be connected to the SMGA (Interviewee 19, 
personal communication, 2017). 
Regarding the function of the SMGW to disconnect the household from the power grid, 
Greveler, U., in (Greveler, 2016) mentioned that apart from the controllable consumers, 
the protection profile for the gateway does not provide any function that disconnects 
the household from the power grid. Such a function carries a special risk, since a 
successful attack on the gateway would have a considerable effect on the individual 
consumer (loss of function of almost all electrical devices) as well as on the power grid 
(potential cascading disconnection of the networks in the event of sudden 
disconnection of many households). 
b. Distribution Energy Resources  
Attacks that have direct control over the smart inverters could be particularly dangerous 
because the attack could intelligently manipulate the device’s operation based on the 
state of the grid. This could help the attacker to amplify undesirable grid states (Qi et 
al., 2016). As a speculative failure scenario, one expert mentioned that in the case a 
threat agent could be able to manipulate enough decentralized power generation, like 
PV systems and switch them off simultaneously, this could lead to grid instability and 
some potential power outages, because the grid itself would not be able to compensate 
the loss (Interviewee 17, personal communication, 2017). As mentioned, this is a 
speculative failure scenario, which will require more quantitative analysis to evaluate 
the potential impact. 
c. Generation, Transmission and Distribution 
At the station and field zones, end points are exposed to potential threats as stated 
before. However, it will require more effort and a distributed attack in order to have a 
larger impact on the overall system. According to the control system architecture, the 
higher the level of the architecture, the more critical it becomes because the information 
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on one specific layer is gathered from all layers below. Therefore, at the lowest level 
i.e., station and field zones (see Figure 4), manipulation of the operational limit 
parameters on industrial equipment would not lead to a big impact on the overall 
system, but could lead to other impacts such as on the physical integrity of the 
equipment. For example, if the parameter of maximum work load is modified thus 
forcing the device to work over the physical limits, this could lead to physical damage 
producing failures that could have an effect on the performance of the specific system 
(Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 4, personal 
communication, 2016; Interviewee 15, personal communication, 2017). 
In a larger attack scenario, if one substation is compromised and turned off, the effect 
will be a power outage on the area covered by this substation, e.g., one street or one 
neighborhood block. Additionally, this kind of attack could have an impact on the overall 
quality of energy distribution in Germany that could indirectly affect utility companies, 
due to the fact that they get paid according to the benchmark and these outages could 
represent an economic impact for them (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016). 
In order to have a larger outage, many power substations would have to be 
compromised simultaneously (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016).  
4.1.2.4 Potential Impact Rating 
According to the potential impacts mentioned above, the quantity and quality criteria 
could be affected by different attack mechanisms. The effect on the quality criteria will 
be higher if simultaneous distributed attacks are performed. Public acceptance would 
also be affected. Therefore, the potential impact is rated as medium to high. 
4.1.2.5 Adaptation strategies and implementation  
In general, the implementation of end-to-end security is a challenge. As an IT security 
expert stated: “It’s probably not realistic or naive to think that we can secure all end-
points. But we need to make sure that we find out about the security breach quickly” 
Very important requirements to improve security is the implementation of security 
capabilities into the devices in terms of authentication, authorization of usage and 
control. On top of this, it is important to implement patch management processes 
including testing to address flaws on software and hardware. Network segmentation 
and monitoring is also required to prevent attacks and isolate them (Interviewee 5, 
personal communication, 2016). 
Specific adaptation mechanisms for each cluster are mentioned as follows: 
a. Consumption  
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If the system is more distributed, more security measures are needed, moreover 
guidelines and implementation references are needed to support vendors for the 
implementation of the measures on devices at customers premises e.g., IoT devices. 
Furthermore, open software would allow getting support from the security community 
(Interviewee 5, personal communication, 2016).  
However, as mentioned before, 100% security cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, it 
would be necessary to consider these distributed devices as untrusted and verify their 
inputs. They should be analyzed using statistical tools to detect whether or not these 
devices are sending manipulated or malicious information. For example, it could be 
required to analyze the measurements taken from the smart meters installed at 
customer’s premises to ensure that they are not maliciously affecting the grid. However, 
this analysis could have some privacy concern implications. There are ways of 
aggregating metering measures at a neighborhood level instead of household levels, 
but such techniques might involve secret sharing schemes or any other cryptographic 
protocol or solutions. Therefore, it is necessary to deploy these techniques and find a 
balance between the perceived granularity by the utility and customer privacy, as well 
as the overall security of the system (Interviewee 13, personal communication, 2017).  
To prevent attacks coming from smart meters, their capabilities should be limited to 
only reading functionality but control functionalities should not be enabled. Thus they 
will be less exposed to attacks (Experten-Workshop 2, 2017). Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, in order to have a larger impact many smart meters or smart meter 
gateways would have to be compromised. Considering that one SMGA could be 
connected to about one million gateways, it is highly required that the SMGA has to be 
certified, which currently is a mandatory regulation in Germany (Interviewee 19, 
personal communication, 2017). 
In order to enhance the SMGA security, the work developed by Detken K. and 
colleagues (Detken, Genzel, Hoffmann, et al., 2014; Detken, Genzel, Rudolph, et al., 
2014) proposes the use of relevant aspects of the Trusted Computing approach, such 
as: measurement and verification of integrity using Trusted Network Connect (TNC). 
This security concept complies with the security requirements by generating a trust 
chain. Integrity verification is first applied at boot time, utilizing secure boot and 
establishing the trust chain including the TNC software. Integrity verification is also 
applied at runtime, utilizing the (at boot time) verified TNC software. The measured 
values of hardware and software components are stored tamper safe in the file system. 
This leads to an advanced gateway security, which affects all adjacent components.  
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b. Distributed Energy Resources 
Regarding the improvement of security for DER systems, experts have mentioned that 
the smart metering infrastructure that is about to be implemented in Germany could 
also be used to secure these systems. Although this is currently not the purpose and 
the development of further regulations would be needed (Interviewee 17, personal 
communication, 2017). 
c. Generation, Transmission and Distribution 
Prevention mechanism such as bad data detection schemes or data filters can be used. 
Normally, control systems are designed considering that some data coming from the 
field could have errors or be wrong, therefore the required dataset is overestimated, 
enabling the possibility to discard wrong data. The implementation of the mentioned 
detection schemes, which relies on physical models (e.g., current or voltage, through 
Ohm's and Kirchhoff’s law), will enable further validation of data coming from the field 
(Interviewee 4, personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 12, personal 
communication, 2017). 
The implementation of these detection mechanism would be limited to the amount of 
data available. Experts agreed that at the transmission level, there is more data 
compared to the distribution level where currently there are not many measurement 
devices posing a challenge for implementing these detection schemes (Interviewee 12, 
personal communication, 2017). 
Furthermore, implementation of better analysis and detection capabilities on industrial 
routers and switches will improve the security of industrial control systems to be able to 
detect and prevent attacks from field devices. However, current industrial networks 
have only basic functionalities, therefore upgrades or new network devices should be 
considered (Interviewee 15, personal communication, 2017). 
4.1.2.6 Adaptation capacity rating  
Some adaptation strategies for prevention have been given. However, the 
implementation of them will be limited due to technical requirements that imply 
additional costs or the development of further regulations frameworks. Therefore, the 
adaptation capacity is rated as medium. 
4.1.2.7 Vulnerability rating 
Considering a combination of high potential impact and medium adaptation capacity. In this 
case, the vulnerability rating is high. 
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Figure 14 summaries the vulnerability assessment due to insecure endpoints 
 
Figure 14 Summary of vulnerability assessment of cyber-physical power systems due to insecure endpoints. For 
the assessment the SGAM domains of the power system were grouped in three clusters: (a) consumption, (b) 
distributed energy resources, (c) generation, transmission and distribution. Source: Authors’ own representation 
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4.1.3 Other technology related conditions 
The following further technology related conditions were identified through the 
interview content analysis. However, due to time constraints a comprehensive 
vulnerability assessment could not be conducted. 
• Insecure interface between components from different vendors or between 
different systems 
• Allowed but unauthorized software and firmware modification  
• Systems running in web services, such as virtual power plants 
4.2 Organizational Security Policies and Procedures 
4.2.1 Lack of interdisciplinary IT-OT knowledge 
4.2.1.1 Exposure and sensitivity 
With the increasing number of complexities and interdependencies between IT and OT 
(Operation Technology) infrastructure of power systems, the needed knowledge to address 
the new cyber-physical systems have changed. Linkages between both infrastructures 
have to be examined and protected in specific ways which is difficult for experts with 
knowledge in only one of those fields. Interdisciplinary knowledge in most of the cases is 
missing and therefore, it is difficult to properly understand, design, implement and operate 
the new systems as a whole (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 2, 
personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 5, personal communication, 2016).  
Different stakeholders are involved in the energy sector, namely traditional large-scale 
commodity providers, distribution network operators, typical consumers, emerging small-
scale producers, metering service providers, IT component developers/providers, and 
several regulatory and standardization institutions. Most of these parties have no strong 
background in IT security (von Oheimb, 2013). Furthermore, during tender processes the 
lack of expertise in both infrastructures could lead to mistakes or no comprehensive 
security requirements description, therefore the systems implemented cannot fulfill 
minimum requirements (Interviewee 18, personal communication, 2017). 
Experts of one domain simply cannot foresee the implications and consequences of their 
decisions for other domains and parts of the system. For instance, on the one hand, if the 
IT department considers servers for OT operation (e.g., HMI, historian server) as part of 
IT-Infrastructure, normal IT security measures (e.g., daily antivirus updates) could have 
consequences on the operational part of the system, which will affect the availability or 
performance of the system (Interviewee 4, personal communication, 2016). On the other 
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hand, a significant portion of OT network are connected, maintained, and operated by IT 
devices and systems. Normally, these assets are maintained by ICS operators and 
engineers rather than experienced IT professionals, which can results in common mistakes 
in maintenance, configuration, and lack of hardening (Bodungen et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, the ongoing implementation of ICT into electricity operation system adds new 
challenges for the system operation. As more ICT functionalities are integrated to electric 
systems, the operational personnel would require more training to know how to deal with 
cyber-physical events. Experts state, that these new systems need skilled operators, 
specifically trained to operate not only the existing electro-technical parts of the system, 
but also the new IT security systems, e.g., intrusion/anomaly detection systems. Personnel 
in operation cannot be re-educated to be IT experts within a short period of time to know 
how to react properly to IT failures (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016).  
On the one hand, operation control centers normally do not integrate failures or alarms 
coming from the ICT infrastructure, therefore the operator is not able to distinguish the 
origin of the failure (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016; Interviewee 18, personal 
communication, 2017). On the other hand, if the IT department manages the anomaly 
detection systems and IDS, it is unclear how any stressor from IT could be transmitted to 
the operation center to react on it (Interviewee 18, personal communication, 2017). 
4.2.1.2 Attack mechanisms and stressors 
The lack of experts in both IT and OT domains opens up many opportunities for attackers 
to harm the system in several ways. Different approaches for securing ICS from IT and OT 
measures create security gaps, such as: improper network segmentation, improper change 
and configuration management, poor local/remote access control, weak generation, use 
and protection of passwords, amongst others. 
If the system is not designed properly due to a lack of knowledge about vulnerable parts of 
the system, improper revision of newly added software and firmware can cause problems 
with the system stability. Improper patch management and implementation of IT security 
measures can also harm the system, as the overall system design gets too complex and 
leaves systems vulnerable to attacks. Gaps in security or faults in the design and 
implementation of security measurements can be used by attackers to compromise the 
system. 
An attack scenario could also leverage the lack of IT-OT expertise of operators, when threat 
agents could flood control centers with errors and alarm signals, to confuse the non-
interdisciplinary skilled operators and leading to a loss of overview of the system. Provoking 
Vulnerability and resilience of cyber-physical power systems. Results from an empirical-based study 
 
Tapia, Mariela; Thier, Pablo; Gößling-Reisemann, Stefan Page 70 
 
critical mistakes, controlling errors and wrong control commands, could then lead to system 
physical damage (Interviewee 4, personal communication, 2016). 
4.2.1.3 Potential impacts  
The implementation of inappropriate security measurements for cyber infrastructure assets 
could have unintended consequences for the physical infrastructure, which in turn yield 
effects on the system performance and stability. 
The lack of personnel with expertise in both IT and OT fields will affect the operation of the 
system. When incidents or events from the IT related to OT are occurring, it would not be 
possible to react on it. Operators without proper training cannot distinguish between error 
messages resulting from technical failures, or natural hazards, or those resulting from a 
targeted attack. If they cannot manage the system properly and according to the real 
problem, the performance of the system can be affected (Interviewee 4, personal 
communication, 2016). 
4.2.1.4 Potential impacts rating  
The implementation of inappropriate security measures due to the lack of interdisciplinary 
knowledge could compromise data availability that could have a direct effect on the 
technical parameters. Exploiting security gaps could also lead to system failures and power 
outages. Therefore, according the VA methodology, the potential impacts range from 
Medium to High. 
4.2.1.5 Adaptation strategies and implementation 
As adaptation strategies, experts demand bridging more expert knowledge between IT and 
OT to help those sectors to understand each other and avoid configuration errors or 
implementation of inappropriate security measures (Interviewee 13, personal 
communication, 2017). Having more expertise on cross-sectional and interdisciplinary 
fields, the industry can be educated towards a better understanding of its own complexity 
and to develop a holistic view on system architecture (Interviewee 6, personal 
communication, 2016; Interviewee 17, personal communication, 2017). This view would 
focus on the connections and interactions between different components and domains. 
With more cross-sectional collaborations, better security measurements and system 
designs can be developed that will consider the complexity and interdependency between 
IT and OT, and more importantly, the critical operational requirements which are timing and 
availability. Defining and assessing security responsibilities from development to operation 
phase will help in addressing specific requirements (Interviewee 9, personal 
communication, 2017). 
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Consolidating existing guidelines and sharing them among different fields could be helpful 
to prepare guidelines for a broader use within the relevant domains and for different actors 
involved in the system (Interviewee 18, personal communication, 2017).  
More specific training for operation is needed, only trained and experienced operators are 
able to understand specific errors and are able to estimate their impact. They will react 
accordingly and can operate the system even when errors occur, whereas improperly 
trained operators might risk damage to components (Interviewee 4, personal 
communication, 2016). Furthermore, they should work in teams of IT and OT experts for 
better reactions on system failures of any kind (Interviewee 19, personal communication, 
2017). 
However, training and education programs for increasing the interdisciplinary knowledge 
of existing staff or the recruitment of specialists could be hindered due to associated costs 
(Interviewee 9, personal communication, 2017). 
4.2.1.6 Adaptation capacity rating 
Adaptation mechanisms were mentioned by the experts, however, as stated from one of 
them, the implementation of training programs for increasing the interdisciplinary 
knowledge of existing staff or the recruitment of specialists could be hindered due to 
associated costs. For this reason, the adaptation capacity is rated as medium. 
4.2.1.7 Vulnerability rating 
Considering high potential impacts and medium adaptation capacity, in this case the 
vulnerability due to insecure communication is rated as High. 
Figure 15 summaries the vulnerability assessment due to lack of interdisciplinary IT-OT 
knowledge. 
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Figure 15 Summary of vulnerability assessment of cyber-physical power systems due to lack of interdisciplinary 
IT-OT knowledge. Source: Authors’ own representation 
4.2.2 Improper security patch management  
4.2.2.1 Exposure and sensitivity 
Software/Firmware patches in some cases are not regularly checked to ensure that they 
are updated. The consequences of an improper security patch management in the standard 
IT networks became obvious in the latest global cyber-attacks such as ‘WannaCry’. This 
attack could have been avoided or mitigated if an adequate implementation of available 
security patches from corporate and government IT departments would have been 
performed and more than 10-year-old operating systems would have been upgraded. 
Experts agreed that systems connected to the Internet require at least weekly or even daily 
security patches, in order to maintain their level of security. However, organizations and 
end-users occasionally fail to see the need to patch their outdated operating systems and 
network components. 
In the case of industrial control systems, expert stated that these systems usually tend to 
not be well patched, either because vendors do not provide security patches for their 
devices or because the particular system is critical for the operation and it is not possible 
to turn it off in order to apply the security measures. As a consequence, the security-gaps 
are not properly patched and systems are exposed to malicious intrusions. 
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4.2.2.2 Attack mechanism and stressors 
Threat agents will be able to gain access to different system components by exploiting a 
known security-gap that has not yet been patched. Malware could be installed and used to 
replace or add any function to a device or a system, such as sending sensitive information 
or controlling devices (Mo et al., 2012). 
4.2.2.3 Potential impacts  
Depending on the system domain where the unpatched software or firmware has been 
compromised, the potential impacts could have different effects. 
For instance, the failure scenario AMI.25 from the NESCOR catalog describes the potential 
impacts due to an attack via an unpatched firewall in the metering systems. This condition 
could allow the threat agent to shut down the AMI head-end, causing outages due to the 
utility's inability to implement demand response at peak times (NESCOR, 2015). 
If the attack is targeted at industrial control firmware in distribution substations, the threat 
agent could be able to gain control of the substation and shut down segments of the 
distribution grid producing power outages. The extent of the outages will depend on the 
number of substations being compromised (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016). 
Furthermore, inadequate patch management or a failure in the patching process could also 
affect the availability of system components being patched, which can cause power 
outages. (see failure scenario AMI.28 in (NESCOR, 2015)).  
4.2.2.4 Potential impacts rating 
Based on the detailed analysis above, the quantity and quality criteria could be affected 
depending on the attack mechanisms and on which domain the attack is target at. The 
effect on the quality criteria will be higher if simultaneous distributed attacks are performed. 
Therefore, the potential impacts on the system are rated from medium to high. 
4.2.2.5 Adaptation strategies and implementation  
Experts mentioned, that proper patch-management is essential for keeping up with 
technological developments and securing systems with access to the Internet. The 
management should include a severity rating and timeframes for patching vulnerabilities 
(NESCOR, 2015). 
However, regular patching for industrial control system, especially SCADA systems 
represent a challenge because these systems are time-critical. Due to the fact that there is 
no test environment, patching may introduce new unknown vulnerabilities or ultimately 
break the system (Cherdantseva et al., 2015). Experts suggest the implementation of 
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redundant systems to avoid down time. However, the application of this measure would 
depend on the overall design of the system and can be hindered by associated additional 
costs.  
Even if we keep up-to-date with all patches and mitigations, unknown zero-day exploits and 
unannounced vulnerabilities are widespread (McLaughlin et al., 2015). 
Another solution as some of the interview partners mentioned, would be to establish 
mandatory regulations to raise the awareness and willingness to implement proper 
patching and updating. 
4.2.2.6 Adaptation capacity rating 
From the considerations described above, according to the VA, the adaptation capacity is 
rated as medium. 
4.2.2.7 Vulnerability rating 
Considering high potential impacts and medium adaptation capacity, the vulnerability in this 
case is rated as high. 
Figure 16 summaries the vulnerability assessment due to improper security patch-
management. 
 
Figure 16 Summary of vulnerability assessment of cyber-physical power systems due to improper security patch-
management. Source: Authors’ own representation 
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4.3 The Human Factor 
4.3.1 Lack of security awareness or poor response to security policies inside the 
organization 
4.3.1.1 Exposure and sensitivity 
The lack of an adequate security training and awareness programs in a power sector 
organization, e.g., generation power plants, distribution and transmission operators, etc., 
can lead to inadequately trained personnel, who may inadvertently provide the visibility, 
knowledge and opportunity for external or internal stressors to execute a successful attack 
(NIST, 2014). 
On the one hand, according to the IT experts, social engineering is one of the fastest 
growing security problems. This attack mechanism enables the threat agent to exploit one 
of the weaknesses present in every organization: the human factor. In this case, personnel 
could be manipulated by external threat agents into helping them get access to the internal 
system or perform an attack. An inadequately trained workforce will not be aware of the 
policies and procedures necessary to secure organizational information and equipment, 
resulting in the potential for weaknesses to be exploited for example: inserting malicious 
USB sticks into machines in the corporative or operative network, surfing suspicious 
websites which often contain zero-day exploits, or lack of care with identification badges, 
which can used to gain partial or complete access to critical systems (NIST, 2014). 
Furthermore, critical information about system configuration or architecture could be made 
publicly available through vendors’ or asset, owners’ website, employee social media sites. 
Potential threat agents can leverage this information for the attack planning. 
On the other hand, further potential threat agents include disgruntled employees with high 
potential for criminal or malicious behavior, or ex-employees, who were not properly 
managed when they left (Interviewee 4, personal communication, 2016). They have high 
knowledge of the systems and access to critical functions or sensitive data (depending on 
their position), therefore they could be able to identify possible weak internal structures and 
methods to perform an attack, causing severe damage to the system.  
Many lessons about cyber-threats have been learned by organization at their corporative 
ICT domain, and personnel are made aware of and trained to recognize those threats. 
However, ICS operators, engineers and other external involved actors such as: ICS 
vendors, system integrators, contractors and maintenance personnel lack cyber-security 
training and education (Luiijf, 2016). As stated by the IT security experts, most attacks in 
the station zone (see smart grid architecture in (IEC, 2020)) come either from human 
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failure, misconfiguration or social engineering. While networks at operation, enterprise and 
market zones tend to be secured via firewalls, VPN, IDS and monitoring systems, the 
station zone is extremely vulnerable to the human factor (Interviewee 1, personal 
communication, 2016).  
4.3.1.2 Attack mechanisms and stressors 
Through social engineering, threat agents are exploring new attack mechanisms targeting 
different levels in the organization. For example, ‘spear phishing’ is one attack mechanism, 
where external threat agents send emails containing hidden malicious code to employees 
to infect the facility’s network. In the Ukrainian case in 2015, threat agents developed a 
malware (‘Blackenergy 3’) and created weaponized documents to deliver the malware via 
email. Emails with malicious documents as attachment were sent to people inside the 
organization in a phishing campaign. Threat actors successfully installed the malware after 
employees open the weaponized email attachments. The malware included plugin software 
to collect system access credentials and perform reconnaissance activity on the internal 
network. Using the stolen credentials, threat agents accessed the industrial control 
environment and carried out a complex set of actions (Styzcynski and Beach-
Westmoreland, 2017). 
Another way of breaching the perimeter is through USB-based attacks. USB peripherals 
have become an attractive tool for launching cyber-attacks, where threat agents take 
advantage of users who tend to use these peripherals casually, assuming they are safe, 
when in fact they may carry an embedded malicious payload that can be used to launch 
attacks (Nissim et al., 2017). USB devices can be used also for attacking specific ICS 
targets, such as PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers), as demonstrated by the famous 
‘Stuxnet’ malware against centrifuges at the Iranian uranium enrichment facility outside 
Natanz. In this case, threat agents performed indirect infiltration via infected mobile devices 
and USB sticks from contractors who had legitimate access to the most critical system of 
the facility (Langner, 2013). The Stuxnet worm was an unprecedentedly complex piece of 
code that attacked in three stages. (1) First, it targeted Microsoft Windows machines and 
networks, repeatedly replicating itself. Using compromised digital certificates, Stuxnet was 
able to bypass firewalls as it continued spreading itself throughout the local communication 
networks of the SCADA system. Stuxnet’s peer-to-peer communication capabilities allowed 
the malware to update itself, even when the compromised device did not have direct access 
to the Internet. (2) Then, it searched for Siemens Step7 software, which is also Windows-
based and used to program PLCs. (3) Finally, once the targeted PLC was infected, Stuxnet 
changed its operation mode. Using the PLC rootkit, the malware modified the PLC code to 
perform a disclosure attack and record the received data. After recording data for some 
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time, Stuxnet began sabotaging the physical system through a disruption attack. While 
changing the control signal sent to the actuators, Stuxnet hid the damage to the plant by 
feeding the previously recorded data to the SCADA’s monitoring systems (Knapp, 2011; 
Kushner, 2013; New Jersey Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Cell, 2017). 
Figure 17 illustrates Stuxnet attack scenario. 
 
Figure 17: How Stuxnet Worked. Source (Kushner, 2013) 
An example of an attack performed by insider threat agents is the case of manipulation of 
smart meters in Malta. Employees of the state-owned energy supplier Enemalta 
manipulated around 1,000 smart meters against payment of bribes and installed them at 
customers with high electricity consumption. The smart meters were configured to record 
up to 75 percent less energy consumption than really consumed. The meters were 
manipulated without breaking seals or protective mechanisms. There was evidence that 
meters had been manipulated by other customers to measure higher power consumption 
in order to keep the total consumption of a district constant and to disguise the fraud (BSI, 
2015b). 
Vulnerability and resilience of cyber-physical power systems. Results from an empirical-based study 
 
Tapia, Mariela; Thier, Pablo; Gößling-Reisemann, Stefan Page 78 
 
4.3.1.3 Potential impacts  
Depending on the relevance of the compromised data or the privileges the targeted user 
has, potential impacts could have different ranges. Through information leakage, a threat 
agent could obtain legitimate credentials to access critical systems. If an attacker passed 
through a system, it would be possible to compromise the SCADA system infrastructure 
(e.g., the data historian server). If the situation was aggravated by an improper segregation 
of corporate and industrial control network, the threat agent could gain control over field 
devices and perform incorrect or harmful operation control actions causing outages of 
unknown duration or direct physical damage of the ICS assets. Furthermore, the attack  
would not only disrupt electricity distribution, but also destroy IT systems, flood call centers 
and inhibit incident response, like in the Ukraine attack in 2015 (Styzcynski and Beach-
Westmoreland, 2017). 
In the case of the smart metering infrastructure, compromising the IT infrastructure at the 
Smart Meter Gateway Administration (SMGA) facilities could allow the threat agent to use 
the secure communication channel to attack almost one million smart meter gateways, for 
example switching them off, which will cause grid instability and potential power outages 
(Interviewee 19, personal communication, 2017).  
The NESCOR catalog (NESCOR, 2015) illustrates further potential impacts due to social 
engineering on: metering infrastructure (see AMI.3, AMI.9), transmission (see 
WAMPAC.4), distribution (see DGM.10) and generation domains (see GEN.4, GEN.9).   
4.3.1.4 Potential impacts rating  
Considering the possible range of impacts that could affect both the qualitative and 
quantitative criteria, in this case the potential impacts on the system are rated as medium 
to high. 
4.3.1.5 Adaptation strategies and implementation  
Experts suggest stricter mandatory security measurements on different organizational 
levels to counter social engineering. Operators and administrative staff must be trained, so 
that they are aware of conditions that could compromise the system. (e.g., poor password 
management, improper mail attachments management, unidentified USB-drives, etc.) 
Employees could be engaged in social engineering exercises, where they receive company 
generated phishing mails or they find placed rogue USB drives to learn how to react 
properly to the threat of social engineered attacks. Security training and security awareness 
programs should be adapted to each member of the staff according to their position. It 
should include a continuous retraining effort over a specific period of time to reflect new 
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procedures, new technologies, and reinforcement of the importance of the cybersecurity 
program (ENISA, 2012; NIST, 2014). Besides this, there should be better personal 
background checks of new employees to ensure all staff with operational or administrative 
access to ICS are appropriately screened (ENISA, 2016). 
There should be more awareness and willingness towards a harmonized effort from human 
resources, management, IT-department and regulatory authorities to agree on strict 
security policies for organizations. Nevertheless, the implementation costs of security 
policies and training programs can hinder the approval and limit the security level 
implemented, as stated by an expert. The application of security measures could also be 
limited to the engagement level of employees. 
4.3.1.6 Adaptation capacity rating  
Considering that adaptation strategies are given, but their application will depend on the 
willingness of the involved actors, the adaptation capacities are rated medium. 
4.3.1.7 Vulnerability rating 
According to the VA methodology, the combination of high potential impact and medium 
adaptation capacity, yields a high vulnerability rating. 
Figure 18 summaries the vulnerability assessment due to lack of security awareness or poor 
response to security policies inside the organization. 
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Figure 18 Summary of vulnerability assessment of cyber-physical power systems due to lack of security awareness 
or poor response to security policies inside the organization. Source: Authors’ own representation 
4.3.2 Lack of security awareness among consumers  
4.3.2.1 Exposure and sensitivity 
End users represent another vulnerable point for the system. The lack of awareness or lack 
of understanding of the consequences of low security from the customer's side could 
compromise the power system. Experts confirm that the majority of end-users do not have 
expert-knowledge about their home automation systems and Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices, thus they are not aware of how to properly secure and maintain their smart 
devices. 
Experts mentioned that on the one hand, IoT and home automation devices, especially off-
the-shelf products, have well-known security-gaps that attackers can exploit. On the other 
hand, end-user devices which are not properly patched or maintained could be connected 
to the home network, raising the vulnerability of the system by adding more insecure entry 
points. 
A more complex problem mentioned by an expert arises from end-users being prosumers, 
but yet do not have the expert-knowledge to implement and maintain appropriate security 
measures for DER systems. 
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4.3.2.2 Attack mechanisms and stressors 
A threat agent can use eavesdropping to access customer data and steal private 
information including electricity usage through a firewall which intentionally or 
unintentionally allows direct access from another networks. Besides eavesdropping, threat 
agents could gain access to smart meter devices to manipulate metering data, or 
manipulate data on Distributed Energy Resources system parameters. IoT devices could 
be compromised and used to perform a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. 
4.3.2.3 Potential impacts 
Depending on the attack mechanism, the customer’s privacy could be exposed or 
communication channels could be used as a medium to manipulate data and send incorrect 
control commands that could lead to power system instability and outages. 
The failure scenario DER.2 from the NESCOR catalog (NESCOR, 2015) (NESCOR, 2015) 
illustrates the case when a large DER system is erroneously connected to a wireless 
corporative network and thus exposing the DER system to the Internet. The threat agent 
could gain control and alter the operation of the DER functions. Consequently, the grid 
could experience damaging reverse power flows, or overloads to substation transformers. 
AMI insecure networks or sometimes even protected networks could offer opportunities for 
a potential breach to compromise customer privacy, which could lead to a loss of customer 
confidence on AMI. 
4.3.2.4 Potential impacts rating 
Considering that the security requirements: integrity and confidentiality can be 
compromised and this could produce an effect on the qualitative criteria, as well as on the 
delivery of power, the potential impacts due to the lack of security awareness among 
consumers is rated from medium to high. 
Adaptation strategies and implementation  
To prevent breaches with potentially large impacts, interview partners recommended that 
education regarding cyber-security for the end-user side is needed to reach a higher 
security level. Better knowledge of their own smart systems raises awareness among end-
users. It further enables end-users to properly operate and maintain their system, so that 
they could ensure a certain degree of security on their own. Mandatory security 
measurements for home devices and their maintenance would help to reach a minimum 
security for home automation systems. However, these strategies are not in place yet and 
there is no policy enforcement for their application. 
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Achievement of higher security level will be in conflict with a short-term economic rationale, 
as experts mentioned. Therefore, in most cases, the implementation of higher security 
measures on the customer or prosumer side will be limited by their willingness to pay for 
security. 
Furthermore, experts stated that most of the security measures that are currently in place, 
are trying to keep the malicious attackers outside of the system, therefore one of the biggest 
challenges is to go further from prevention or detection of cyber-attacks towards recovery 
mechanism after a successful attack. Together with better monitoring and detection 
systems, this could offer better possibilities to react on attacks and manipulated data. But 
it is important to be aware of customer privacy when applying more monitoring systems. 
4.3.2.5 Adaptation capacity rating 
Considering that the mentioned adaptation strategies are not in place yet and that the 
willingness of customers for adaptation is limited, the current adaptation capacity in this 
category is rated low.  
4.3.2.6 Vulnerability rating 
Following the VA methodology, medium to high potential impacts combined with a low 
adaption capacity rate leads to a high overall vulnerability concerning the lack of security 
awareness from the customer´s side. 
Figure 19 summaries the vulnerability assessment of cyber-physical power systems due to 
lack of security awareness among consumers 
 
Figure 19 Summary of vulnerability assessment of cyber-physical power systems due to lack of security awareness 
among consumers. Source: Authors’ own representation  
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4.4 Regulations 
4.4.1 Lack of effective implementation of security standards and regulations  
4.4.1.1 Exposure and sensitivity 
Different technical and organizational standards have been developed to address cyber 
security requirements in smart grids. However, as experts have stated, in most of the 
cases, they are only recommendations and their implementation is not obligatory. 
For instance, the IEC 62351 set of standards was developed to address security for 
substation infrastructure and provides a framework for end-to-end security for the 
communications between software applications. It relies heavily on the use of TLS to 
protect power system against different attack mechanisms (International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC), 2007). 
Despite the fact that this standard provides security improvements for protocols such as: 
IEC 61850 (GOOSE, SV and MMS), IEC 60870-5- 104 and DNP3, and IEC 60870-5-101 
and serial DNP3, in practice it is not always applied (Basagiannis et al., 2015; McLaughlin 
et al., 2015) and experts mentioned that often vendors do not implement the recommended 
security measures in their products. IT experts considered that the absence of mandatory 
regulations to enforce power system operators to implement minimum required security 
standards or vendors to provide the necessary security requirements in their products 
expose the system to possible cyber-attacks.  
4.4.1.2 Attack mechanism and stressors 
A threat agent could exploit known weaknesses due to the lack of authentication or 
encryption in certain standard protocols, get unauthorized access to the system, 
manipulate and compromise communication sessions. 
Some examples of possible stressors can be found in the literature for attacks, such as: 
DoS attacks (Dondossola et al., 2008, 2009) or man-in-the-middle (Maynard et al., 2014) 
on networks running the IEC 60870-5 protocol. The work from (Kush et al., 2014) also 
demonstrated a practical attack by exploiting weaknesses in authentication and encryption 
in GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation Event) to spoof messages with incorrect 
data between each valid message. 
4.4.1.3 Potential impacts  
Depending on the attack mechanism, the impacts could differ. For example, if a threat 
agent intercepts unencrypted plain text SCADA frames (such as Distributed Network 
Protocol 3.0, DNP3) that contains valuable information, like control and setting information 
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for intelligent equipment devices (IED), the threat agent could be able to shut down device 
services, send incorrect commands and cause disruptions (Kush et al., 2014). 
4.4.1.4 Potential impacts rating 
Considering that the IT security requirements, compromise could lead to power system 
instability and outages. According to the VA methodology, the potential impacts on the 
system are rated from medium to high. 
4.4.1.5 Adaptation strategies and implementation  
There are good practice guidelines that recommend the implementation of higher security 
standards to secure device communications protecting messages and ensuring integrity 
within power systems management and substation automation. However, according to 
experts, they are not mandatory and the compliance of minimum-security levels is not 
enforced by regulations.  
Furthermore, the decision to upgrade legacy systems in order to implement the security 
measures could be delayed until the next planned lifecycle equipment replacement, due to 
different factors. The critical level of the process or economic constraints in the organization 
could hinder the application. As a consequence, currently installed legacy devices using 
legacy protocols will ensure that many vulnerable systems will remain in the field, waiting 
to be exploited (Knapp and Samani, 2013). 
4.4.1.6 Adaptation capacity rating  
Considering that there are already adaptation mechanisms to improve security in the smart 
grids but the willingness to apply them could be limited, the adaptation capacity is rated as 
medium. 
4.4.1.7  Vulnerability rating 
Considering high potential impacts and medium adaptation capacity, in this case the 
vulnerability is rated as high. 
Figure 20 summaries the vulnerability assessment due to lack of effective implementation of 
security standards and regulations. 
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Figure 20 Summary of vulnerability assessment of cyber-physical power systems due to lack of effective 
implementation of security standards and regulations. Source: Authors’ own representation 
4.4.2 Lack of coordinated effort to improve security  
For this category a comprehensive assessment accordingly to the VA methodology was 
not conducted due to time constraints. But the main findings from the interview analysis are 
presented below. 
In the case of Germany, security regulations are mainly focused on smart metering and 
critical infrastructures. However, the experts mentioned that an effective coordination to 
improve security for the overall system is missing. According to the German legislation, 
electricity network operators have to establish and certify an Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) based on IEC/ISO 27001. However, currently8 there are no 
mandatory regulations to secure small scale DER systems (Interviewee 2, personal 
communication, 2016) which according to the VA performed in section 4.1 and 4.3.2, have 
critical points that can be exploited by threat agents causing significant impacts to the 
power system. 
Similarly, in the case of the smart metering infrastructure, the security measures based on 
Protection Profiles (PP) and technical guidelines (TR-03109) do not include regulations for 
other services or devices equipped with extensive control possibilities that could be 
connected to the home automation network. 
Furthermore, improving the security from power generation and grid operators’ side would 
imply additional economic investments and this could be transferred to the customers via 
 
8 By the date of the interviews, i.e. 2016 and 2017 
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electricity bills. An expert on the power sector mentioned, that customers are not willing to 
pay a higher price for better security. They prefer to choose their power supplier based on 
the lowest price and thus will not accept a new power system which offers no major direct 
benefits compared to the old system (Interviewee 6, personal communication, 2016). 
Experts on IT security stated that, customers were not asked nor included in the process 
of the energy transformation and this could be the case of digitalization transformation as 
well. Therefore, lack of awareness on the importance of new technologies and the related 
security on customer’s side could hinder the willingness to invest in more secure power 
solutions, as customers do not know the many advantages gained from a secure power 
system (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016). 
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4.5 Illustration of the Event-based Vulnerability Assessment methodology  
This section shows examples that illustrate the application of the methodology used for the 
event-based vulnerability assessment EVA. Here, the vulnerability level was identified for four 
specific stressors from ICT: (1) GPS signal spoofing, (2) insider threat against SCADA 
systems, (3) manipulation of ICS firmware in substations, and (4) Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure data eavesdropping. These stressors were mentioned by the experts during the 
interviews and identified through the content analysis method.  
Each stressor was categorized according to the domain and layer of the power system where 
it could take place. Figure 21 shows the location of each stressor on the reference architecture 
model.  
 
Figure 21 Location on the reference architecture model of stressors used as example for the application of the 
Event-based VA. The stressors are numbered as: (1) GPS signal spoofing, (2) insider threat against SCADA 
systems, (3) manipulation of ICS firmware in substations, and (4) Advanced Metering Infrastructure data 
eavesdropping. 
The EVA methodology (see Figure 1) was applied to evaluate the vulnerability due to each 
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Figure 22 Vulnerability assessment of CPPS due to stressor (1) GPS signal spoofing. Source: Own representation. 
 






• ”No authentication in civilian GPS messages 
(plain text)
• GPS signal generators are available in the 
market → send out arbitrary signals
• Replay attacks also feasible to cause a  clocks 
offset on the PMU ” [2]
Potential Impacts on system services
Receivers may calculate incorrect locations or 
clock offsets
→ Wrong state estimation of the grid
→ Incorrect operation control actions 
→ Power Outages
Potential impact: Medium to High
Adaptation Strategies
• Different types of verification can be 
implemented across the GPS receivers to limit 
the feasibility of spoofing attacks [1] :
• Message content verification
• Receiver location verification
• Single receiver clock offset verification (given 
that GPS satellites are tightly synchronized the 
difference between a receiver’s clock and that 
of a satellite should be similar across different 
satellites)
• Group receiver clock offset verification (using 
synchronization protocols for GPS receivers 
within a local substation) 
• ”Physical security, patrolling the substation 
perimeter” [2]
Adaptation readiness
• ”Increasing awareness in energy 
sector” 
• Implementation depends on 
other actors → GPS manufactures 
”Current commercial off-the-shelf 
GPS receivers do not provide 
features required to implement 
detection mechanism” (GPS 
receivers should record the 
reception time of each individual 
GPS message [1], [2]





[1] D.-Y. Yu, A. et al., 
(2014) “Short Paper: 
Detection of GPS Spoofing 
Attacks in Power Grids” 
[2] D.-Y. Yu, (2017, 
January 24). Phone 
interview
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Figure 24 Vulnerability assessment of CPPS due to stressor (3) ICS firmware manipulation in power substations. 
Source: Own representation  
 
Figure 25 Vulnerability assessment of CPPS due to stressor (4) Advance Metering Infrastructure data 
eavesdropping. Source: Own representation  
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4.6 Vulnerability Assessment Summary 
Table 3 summaries the results of the vulnerability assessment for each category and 
subcategory described in detail above. As it can be seen according to the assessment, all the 
identified conditions in the different categories make the cyber-physical power system more 
vulnerable. Data security requirements will be compromised if threat agents exploit one or 
more of the identified critical points. Depending on the attack mechanism this will lead not only 
to grid instability or power outages, but also the privacy of customers could be affected. In 
case of power outages, their magnitude and duration will depend on the system architecture. 
On one hand, centralized operations will always be more attractive to attackers because they 
represent a single point of failure and a successful attack could result in a wide-extended 
blackout. On the other hand, a more distributed architecture formed by smaller units in a 
cellular structure could lessen the impact of the attack because they have the capacity to run 
independently and isolate themselves in the case of grid failures. 
In spite of the existence of adaptation mechanisms that could minimize the impact, it was 
found that their implementation could be hindered by the lack of policy enforcement or the un-
readiness of the involved actors to implement these measures. Therefore, the challenge is to 
define an appropriate regulatory landscape without adding complex procedures and 
monitoring its effective implementation. 
Table 3 Categories and subcategories that reflect critical properties, structures and elements of the cyber-
physical power and the corresponding ratings of Potential Impacts, Adaptive Capacity and Vulnerability on the 










Insecure endpoints M-H M H




Improper patch management M-H M H





Lack of security awareness in
organizations
M-H M H




Lack of effective implementation of 
standards and regulations
M-H M H
Lack of coordinated effort to improve 
security
M-H M H
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5 Resilience management strategy  
The VA unveiled the critical vulnerable points of cyber-physical power systems. Security 
measures, if applied, have great potential to reduce some vulnerabilities. However, there are 
further challenges. First, security measures focus mainly on trying to keep the malicious 
attackers outside of the system, focusing less on recovering mechanism after a successful 
attack. Second, the dynamic characteristic of ICT systems, as well as the complex 
interconnections and interdependencies with power systems, make it infeasible to analyze all 
possible stressors coming from the cyber domain that could threaten the power system. 
Further stressors of unknown nature commonly referred to as ‘black swans’, such as: 
unanticipated information system failures (e.g., bugs, ‘zero-days exploits) or more innovative 
and highly sophisticated attack mechanisms (i.e., advanced persistent threats), and the 
unknown frequency of these (probability of occurrence) pose significant challenges on 
developing preventive security methods. 
Examples of these uncertain events with low probabilities, yet destructive tendencies are the 
‘WannaCry’ ransomware and the ‘NotPetya’ cyber-attacks occurred in 2017. The cyber-attack 
against the Ukrainian energy infrastructure in 2016 caused by the highly customized malware 
‘Crashoverride / Industroyer’ (see more details about ‘Crashoverride’ malware in Box 1 from 
section 4.1.1  Insecure communications) is another example of a ‘black swan’ against cyber-
physical systems. 
Therefore, one of the biggest challenges to secure the power system is to find a way to 
broaden the horizon in handling known and unknown stressors by including recovering, 
adapting and learning mechanism after successful attacks, instead of only focusing on 
prevention and detection. This was the objective of the second part of the study. Our main 
concern was to investigate how to increase the resilience in CPPS. For this purpose, a 
resilience strategy was developed by using the resilience management approach presented 
in section 3.2 to identify how CPPS can be better prepared for any kind of stressor. 
In the following sections the results of the resilience management strategy and related 
measures will be described for each phase. 
5.1 Preparation and Prevention 
As a first step during the preparation and prevention phase, weak points in the system need 
to be identified and effective preventive measures and guidelines must be derived from the 
results (Acatech et al., 2017). When vulnerabilities, attack vectors and system impacts are 
known, countermeasures must be developed based on traditional risk assessment and 
management procedures. For these tasks, a shared effort and cooperation between IT and 
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operation technology (OT) is needed. Typically, IT cyber security is based on providing 
confidentiality, integrity and availability to cyber assets, while power system security is based 
on engineering design and operational strategies. Therefore, IT and power system security 
should be combined to provide the resilience of the cyber-physical power system (IEC, 2016). 
Improvements in security analysis, threat modeling and overall system design will aid the goal 
of building a resilient system (Interviewee 13, personal communication, 2017). Risk 
management and risk assessment based on models and simulations will help to figure out the 
necessary security measures (Interviewee 18, personal communication, 2017; Interviewee 19, 
personal communication, 2017). A holistic and comprehensive risk assessment that involves 
reviewing policies and procedures, as well as identifying assets and systems, communication 
paths and attack vectors, weaknesses, and threat sources will help to determine the level of 
risk to assets and systems. The evaluation of attack scenarios and attack trees will provide a 
much more accurate accounting of their likelihood of occurrence, which will produce a risk 
mitigation strategy that is better prioritized, more targeted, and cost-effective (Bodungen et 
al., 2017). 
Frameworks for risk assessment and management must specifically focus on cyber-physical 
systems and account for the complex interconnections between both infrastructures 
considering potential cascading effects between both infrastructures. Some examples of risk 
management tools designed for ICS or for utility networks can be found in (Bodungen et al., 
2017; Schauer et al., 2017). Understanding attacks is essential for planning and evaluating 
defenses. Using an approach based on example attacks can help in enabling the 
communication of risks effectively to business decision-makers. See for example the approach 
that uses the top 20 cyber-attacks on ICS developed by(Ginter, 2017). 
In order increase further the resilience of ICS's, some of the standards and common measures 
from business IT security, such as robust programming and the application of security 
standards, are also applicable. However, in the case of CPPS, it would be necessary to have 
more specific security standards, which facilitate the design of this kind of networks 
(Interviewee 15, personal communication, 2017). For this purpose, a shared effort and 
cooperation between IT and physical system operators is required to oversee the possibilities 
and necessary standards for a specific system, as some security standards for computer 
system networks are not suitable for ICS. For instance, unsupported protocols issues must be 
addressed in this phase to avoid further related problems (Interviewee 1, personal 
communication, 2016).  
As mentioned in the VA section, there are already available security standards and regulations 
for ICS. However, an effective implementation of them is still missing (Interviewee 1, personal 
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communication, 2016). As IT experts in ICS mentioned: "We consider that (the current security 
standards) for industrial control systems are not weak, but probably their actual 
implementation within the companies could have some weaknesses.” (Interviewee 15, 
personal communication, 2017). Therefore, an effective implementation of existing security 
standards and regulations is thus an important issue in this phase. 
Furthermore, the continuous deployment of IoT devices in the power sector will require the 
development of more guidelines, references and open source software to support the 
implementation of adequate security requirements (Interviewee 5, personal communication, 
2016). The consolidation, as well as evaluation of existing guidelines and best practices will 
help utility companies or grid operators to find the suitable security measurements for their 
specific system. For instance, the whitepaper developed by BDEW (Bundesverband der 
Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e.V.) in (BDEW, 2015) provides recommendations for all newly 
procured control and telecommunication systems for power industry organizations. Also, the 
report developed in the framework of the research project SPARKS (Smart Grid Protection 
Against Cyber Attacks) project (see (SPARKS Consortium, 2016) provides recommendations 
regarding existing and new standards relevant to securing Smart Grid and identifies critical 
gaps in existing standards and in standards under development. 
From another point of view, more effective and engaging security training and awareness 
programs targeted at corporate staff and IT / OT personnel is of paramount importance. Better 
awareness and engagement of personnel will contribute to addressing attacks mechanism 
such as social engineering. 
Technology-wise, the implementation of additional measures for data storage and preserving 
unused resources - operational slack - to better deal with surprises are helpful (Fischer and 
Lehnhoff, 2019). 
5.1.1 IT Prevention Mechanism 
There are specific IT prevention mechanisms that contribute to preparation and prevention of 
CPPS. For instance, security driven design (“security by design”) should be the standard 
instead of just adding security features via updates and patches (Interviewee 13, personal 
communication, 2017). Furthermore, multiple levels of security should be used and security 
mechanisms should be built on top of each other to preserve the overall security of the system. 
Firstly, the implementation of cryptographic methods for data and communication channels is 
required in order to ensure data integrity and prevent unintended disclosure of information in 
transit. On top of this, the implementation of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is required to 
have an effective visibility of attacker activities. (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016; 
Interviewee 13, personal communication, 2017).  
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However, even if the communication channel is secure, the endpoints could still be 
compromised. Therefore, to address the challenges of end-to-end security, as an IT-security 
expert stated, it is necessary to make sure that it is possible find out about the security 
breaches quickly (Interviewee 5, personal communication, 2016). Very important 
requirements to improve security is the effective implementation of security capabilities into 
endpoints in terms of authentication, and authorization of usage and control (Interviewee 5, 
personal communication, 2016). From the perspective of security engineering, one special 
requirement is scalability for monitoring, maintaining and updating endpoints, due to the 
increasing number of connected devices, which must be monitored, updated, and maintained 
(Interviewee 5, personal communication, 2016). 
The implementation of trusted computing features is also important for software/firmware 
integrity. As one of the interviewees mentioned, there is no secure software and security 
should be hardware based. A trusted platform should be used, which is a hardware device 
integrated with the systems that cannot be removed without destroying the system, thus 
assuring integrity (Interviewee 1, personal communication, 2016). 
Furthermore, device hardening which refers to different techniques to reduce the attack 
surface of the system components should also be implemented. In the first place, reducing 
available services and functionalities to the strict required ones. Closing unwanted service 
ports and removing non required libraries helps reducing the probability of a device being 
vulnerable to security exploits (Fischer and Lehnhoff, 2019). The second part of hardening is 
to keep the software and firmware up-to-date and establish patch management processes 
that include testing to address flaws on software and hardware. Device hardening increases 
the ability of a system to absorb ongoing cyber-attacks by increasing the complexity of finding 
and exploiting vulnerabilities within a system’s devices (Fischer and Lehnhoff, 2019). 
Regarding access control to software or equipment, a common way to reduce complexity in 
order to make access control manageable is role-based access control (RBAC), where 
subjects are not representing individual persons but functional roles. A person is then allowed 
to act in defined roles and each role has rights attached to it as a subject in the access control 
matrix (Fischer and Lehnhoff, 2019). The standard IEC 62351-8 provides guidelines for 
architecture and implementation of RBAC in energy systems. Time-constraints and 
computational limits of devices make it impossible to have full access control mechanisms 
down to the field layer. It is necessary to define areas of mutual trust, where no authentication 
or access restrictions are implemented. Nonetheless, the system design should explicitly 
specify the context and rationale of access control decisions, especially under what 
circumstances should no specific access control mechanism be implemented on a device 
(Fischer and Lehnhoff, 2019). 
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In order to be able to have better control of the flow of data between groups and prevent an 
attack that could be spread through the whole network, segmentation into different functional 
groups is vital. In ICS, the most fundamental separations are between ICS, SCADA and the 
business network, because each one has different security requirements (Fischer and 
Lehnhoff, 2019).  
5.2 Implementation of robust and precautionary design 
As mentioned above, the unknown nature of potential future stressors acting on cyber-physical 
systems make the definition of measures for prevention or preparation difficult. Therefore, the 
second phase of building resilience must focus on the implementation of a robust and 
precautionary system design. This will empower the system to maintain its services even 
under stress or disturbances. 
In section 3.2 the resilience design principles were introduced briefly. In this section the design 
principles will be operationalized for CPPS. 
• Diversity contributes positively to the way a system can respond to stressors. On a 
technological level, the diversity of IT components manufacturers, operating systems 
or communication protocols should be increased in structures and functions of the 
system. 
• Redundancy describes the multiple availability of elements in a system, either in 
number or in functional equivalence. In CPPS, Redundancy of communication 
channels and devices should be ensured. 
• In cyber-physical systems, geographically distributed control architectures, possibly 
extended by virtualization (Mangharam and Pajic, 2013), or based on multi-agent 
control (Lehnhoff and Krause, 2013) are favourable. 
• In terms of buffers and storages, experts suggested the usage of backups on several 
levels in CPPS. Besides the trivial case of energy supply backups (UPS), backups or 
exact copies of digital systems as well as data and hardware backups are required. 
Both should be stored offline in a secure manner (Interviewee 2, personal 
communication, 2016; Interviewee 13, personal communication, 2017). Snapshots of 
systems before critical software updates should be available to mitigate the impact 
from manipulated patches and allow for a quick recovery. 
• Implementing the subsidiarity principle reduces the workload and data flows in the 
hierarchical higher structures. This can contribute to a higher efficiency and a more 
appropriate response in case of attacks hitting the structure. 
• For cyber-physical systems, modularity can be achieved by strictly standardizing 
interfaces and using open protocols. An example of standardization approaches for 
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power grid distribution management systems (DMS) is the work developed by the 
consortium called OpenKONZEQUENZE9 (oK), which brings together German and 
Netherlands Distribution System Operators (DSOs), software vendors, service 
providers and researchers. The oK drives modularization of DMS functionalities, 
establishing a reference architecture and quality standards to overcome the existing 
vendor lock-in and system complexity. The goal is to ensure interoperability and make 
software development vendors independent and faster, while keeping software quality 
at a high (Goering et al., 2016). 
• Based on the analyzed interviews, strongly centralized structures with large power 
plants, central control units and centralized data processing are seen as less resilient, 
because they represent a single point of failure and are more attractive to attackers. 
However, a strongly decentralized structure is not considered resilient either, because 
it requires a higher level of coordination and synchronization in order to not 
compromise the performance and reliability of the grid. Furthermore, if coordination in 
a decentralized system is heavily automated, this adds a new layer of complexity and 
extends the attack surface even further. A better way to achieve more resilience would 
be achieved with a cellular structure, e.g., the cellular approach, as suggested in 
(VDE, 2015), where generation and consumption are balanced within adequately sized 
cells. In Germany, the utility company SWW Wunsiedel GmbH has developed a 
solution based on this concept applying the segmentation into smaller units consisting 
of integrated micro-power plants, intelligent consumers and energy storage capacities 
in order to manage renewable energy volatility and increase cyber-security (see 
(Kleineidam, Jung, et al., 2016; Kleineidam, Krasser, et al., 2016). 
• As discussed with the experts, decentralized physical backup systems are needed, 
which can maintain a stable power supply within decentralized structures, even when 
there is a blackout in central IT and communication systems. They should be able to 
conduct adaptations for system loads, frequencies and reactive power compensation 
based on physical network parameters in cases where digital communication fail. 
In general, resilience design measures may cause technical (i.e. efficiency) or economic 
conflicts. Therefore, design measures must be assessed with a systematic cost-benefit 
analyses that includes long-term effects and the evaluation of damage cost from rare, but 
possible, extremely damaging events (Gößling-Reisemann, 2016). 
 
9 https://www.openkonsequenz.de 
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5.2.1 Detection Mechanism 
Cyber-security focuses on keeping the malicious attackers outside of the system. Cyber-
resilience involves measures to detect and recover if the system has been compromised by a 
threat agent. Different algorithms (e.g., machine learning, statistical or Bayesian networks 
methods among others) should be used to identify manipulated data and flag them as 
untrustworthy, in order to be treated as suspicious or to be ignored (Interviewee 14, personal 
communication, 2017).  
For the physical systems, existing security algorithms in the energy management systems 
(EMS) such as power system state estimation or bad data detection can be used to trigger 
alerts in the case of unexpected behavior (Friedberg et al., 2015). For the detection of 
intentional attacks directed at disrupting the functioning of state estimation, (e.g., see false 
date injection attacks in (Liu et al., 2011)), additional measures to detect the malicious data 
need to be taken into account. Some detection solutions can be found in the literature. For 
instance, in (Kosut et al., 2010), the authors studied the problem of adversarial false data 
injection in power system state estimation and presented a novel formulation for the bad data 
detection problem. They introduced a heuristic method for the detectability of a particular 
attack by the adversary, which allows particularly bad attacks to be easily computed for any 
set of compromised measurement. In (Gaber et al., 2015), a strategy is discussed for detecting 
the presence of bad data and simultaneously estimate it, in order to be able to separate the 
bad data from the power system observations. 
For the ICT systems, existing security solutions such as intrusion detection system (IDS) 
should be used. The specific means of detection used by an IDS may be, for example, rules 
similar to those used by firewalls that allow network traffic that violates security policies to be 
detected. An IDS can also be configured to identify reconnaissance activities, such as host 
and port scans, which may indicate that an attack is imminent (McLaughlin et al., 2015) If 
systems or components cannot be updated or patched, the implementation IDS is therefore 
important to detect if and when systems have been compromised (Interviewee 18, personal 
communication, 2017). An open source network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) 
called Snort10 is one of the most widely known and used IDS in the research community. It 
can perform protocol analysis, content searching, and content matching on network traffic in 
real-time (McLaughlin et al., 2015). 
Anomaly-based detection systems over communication channels will enable the detection and 
distinction of process disturbances from related cyber-attacks. They compare definitions of 
 
10 https://www.snort.org/ 
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what is considered normal for an activity against observed events to identify significant 
deviations. The definition of what is normal can be: (a) threshold-based or (b) profile-based. 
(a) A threshold-based process can monitor the frequency of occurrence of certain events and 
raise an alarm when violation of the threshold occurs. Examples in the communications could 
be the number of packets per second, the size of certain packets or flows, etc. (b) Profile-
based anomaly detection focuses on characterizing the past behavior and detection of any 
change. This normally requires a training period, and careful selection of meaningful 
characteristics to observe (McLaughlin et al., 2015). A study regarding solutions for anomaly 
detection and diagnostic systems based on Multivariate Statistical Process Control (MSPC), 
that aims at distinguishing between attacks and disturbances can be found in the literature 
(see (Iturbe et al., 2016)). 
Another method to detect attackers trying to take over the system could rely on examining 
usage patterns of operators and the connected data history, as an expert suggested. 
Analyzing those usage patterns could show how individual operators use the system. If 
someone is using illegitimately acquired login credentials from another user and is operating 
the system in a different way than the legitimate operator, those deviations could be detected. 
Regarding this, proper password management is key to avoid unauthorized usage of login 
credentials (Interviewee 4, personal communication, 2016). 
5.3 Manage and recover from crises 
In case of a successful attack, it is necessary to manage the crisis by restraining it to the 
smallest possible area or sub-system and recover the system services as quickly as possible. 
The most critical consequences are long-term power failures and in order to reduce the extent, 
business continuity planning, emergency planning and respective measures must be 
implemented on the regional or local level (Acatech et al., 2017; Gößling-Reisemann, 2016). 
Furthermore, to be able to react and to recover the system, it is necessary to quickly identify 
where the failure is located. ICT monitoring systems integrated or coupled to OT monitoring 
systems is needed to detect failures in IT system parts. Experts on both IT and OT are needed 
in the grid control centers, and they need to be able to handle different IT and physical 
infrastructures together. Reaction on possible failures should be planned and trained or 
implemented in advance, not just as a reaction to attacks and failures (Interviewee 1, personal 
communication, 2016; Interviewee 4, personal communication, 2016). This requires active 
emergency planning and exercises with realistic cyber-attacks. Also, monitoring and dynamic 
segmentation enables the identification and isolation of a compromised endpoint (Interviewee 
5, personal communication, 2016). Segmentation capabilities are related to the modular 
design principle and the loose (or optional) coupling paradigm.  
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Moreover, it is beneficial to improve the ability of the system to be operated with or without a 
minimum of ICT, in this way, it could be possible to control it manually or at least secure a soft 
landing of the system in case of an attack to the ICT infrastructure. 
Recovery mechanisms required also depend on the attack as well as the resulting impact. In 
the case of an attack on the software system, reinstallation of the program logic is required. 
Therefore, an uncompromised backup of the control logic is necessary. Furthermore, updating 
the program logic to address/correct the flaws is required (Interviewee 15, personal 
communication, 2017). Backups on any software level are needed to recover computers and 
terminals after an attack. Again, offline backups provide better security, as they cannot be 
compromised by attackers (Interviewee 13, personal communication, 2017), although 
installing these backups is work intensive. 
In case of failures in a centralized system, it is necessary to identify the failing parts and it 
might be helpful to reconfigure the system in a more distributed fashion. The concept of multi-
agent based decentralized control consensus could improve stability and security in the case 
of failures (see (Lehnhoff and Krause, 2013)). Once the recovery mechanism has been 
performed and compromised components have been set-up from backups, the former 
centralized configuration can be re-established. A system would thus be able to gradually go 
from centralized to more decentralized in the case of failures and then go back again. 
Concerning this approach, an expert mentioned that working "in smaller cells could be less 
efficient, because every cell has to provide backup and ancillary services, but it is doable and 
workable as long as this doesn't become the general case". As soon as possible, the system 
should go back to a more central configuration that provides more efficient backup and 
provision of ancillary services (Interviewee 14, personal communication, 2017).  
5.4 Learn for the future 
Past disasters and avoided disasters should be used to learn for the future and thus improve 
the adaptive capacity of the system. This can be achieved by documenting and analyzing 
these crises and events to identify the weaknesses that led to their occurrence (vulnerability 
store). In this sense, digital forensic would allow investigating incidents and near incidents in-
depth and identify lessons learned. Conversely, identifying strengths that contributed to 
prevention or recovery (solution store) can be used as a basis for planning strategies and 
emergency scenarios (Acatech et al., 2017; Gößling-Reisemann, 2016). 
Learning from previous attacks could reveal the attack surface that threat agents used, the 
mechanisms of the attack and it will help to learn how to secure these surfaces or address 
flaws. For example, the lesson learned from attacks like Stuxnet is that companies need better 
preparation for social engineering attacks. This includes better security training for employees 
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as well as proper isolation of business and control system networks (Interviewee 1, personal 
communication, 2016; Interviewee 13, personal communication, 2017). 
When a flaw in the system is discovered and announced, this alerts not only potential 
attackers, but also vendors who can then take countermeasures. If flaws are not announced, 
vendors are not aware of them and cannot perform any countermeasure (Interviewee 15, 
personal communication, 2017). Also, information of successful or unsuccessful attacks could 
be shared between companies to learn from incidents, comparable to the work done by CERT-
Bund (Computer Emergency Response Team for federal agencies) (Interviewee 19, personal 
communication, 2017). Especially averted attacks should be a very good source for learning. 
Current practices of “don’t tell” would need to be replaced with a transparency rule, which 
allows for learning from past mistakes and success stories while maintaining the energy 
system operator’s right to protect their critical business data. 
5.5 Summary of Resilience Management Strategy 
Several resilience enhancing measures were discussed in the previous sections according to 
the four phases of the resilience management approach. Now, we will summarize them by 
sorting the different measures by the categories used in the VA. This enables one to have a 
better overview of the resilience-enhancing measures and connect them to the critical points 
identified in the VA. 
Table 4 summaries the suggested measures for the category Technology, Table 5 summaries 
measures for the category Organizational Security Policies and Procedures, Table 6 
summaries measures for the category the Human Factor and Table 7 summaries measures 
for the category Regulations. 
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Table 4: Resilience-enhancing measures and elements for the category Technology organized by the phases (1) 
Prepare and prevent, (2) Implement robust and precautionary design, (3) Manage and recover, and (4) Learn for 
the future. Source: Own representation. 
 
Vulnerability and resilience of cyber-physical power systems. Results from an empirical-based study 
 
Tapia, Mariela; Thier, Pablo; Gößling-Reisemann, Stefan Page 102 
 
Table 5: Resilience-enhancing measures and elements for the category Organizational Security Policies and 
Procedures organized by the phases (1) Prepare and prevent, (2) Implement robust and precautionary design, 
(3) Manage and recover, and (4) Learn for the future. Source: Own representation. 
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Table 6: Resilience-enhancing measures and elements for the category The Human Factor organized by the 
phases (1) Prepare and prevent, (2) Implement robust and precautionary design, (3) Manage and recover, and 
(4) Learn for the future. Source: Own representation. 
 
 
Table 7: Resilience-enhancing measures and elements for the category Regulations followed by the phases (1) 
Prepare and prevent, (2) Implement robust and precautionary design, (3) Manage and recover, and (4) Learn for 
the future. Source: Own representation. 
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6 Conclusions and Outlook 
It is widely accepted that the power system is rapidly evolving to a large and complex cyber-
physical power system which is vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks. At the same time, the 
attack variants are also becoming more complex, resulting in a necessity to change the 
existing defense mechanisms that are usually based on lessons from past events and are not 
effective for protecting the system against unknown threats. Therefore, an approach that goes 
beyond knowledge about past events and attack mechanisms is needed to aid in protecting 
the power system against known as well as unknown threats. This was the focus of this study. 
We assessed existing and known vulnerabilities of the power and cyber infrastructure, and 
developed a resilience management strategy to prepare cyber-physical power systems for 
unexpected threats. 
In the first part of the study, critical properties, structures and elements that increase the 
vulnerability of cyber-physical power systems were identified using the vulnerability 
assessment approach based on (Gößling-Reisemann et al., 2013; von Gleich et al., 2010). 
Two assessment methodologies were applied, an event-based vulnerability assessment 
(EVA) and a structural based vulnerability assessment (SVA). The input for the assessment 
were obtained from experts from power and IT sectors during semi- structured interviews and 
two expert workshops. The expert statements were evaluated by means of a comprehensive 
qualitative content analysis methodology. Review of relevant literature on the topic was 
included for the assessment. The results were grouped under the categories: (1) Technology, 
(2) Organizational security policies and procedures, (3) The human factor and (4) Regulations. 
For each category, further subcategories were defined that matched the focus of the 
assessment on stressors coming from the ICT infrastructure. Some of the identified conditions 
that contribute to a high vulnerability rating include: insecure communications or poor security 
features on end points, especially at the customer premises that could compromise data 
integrity, availability and confidentiality. Social engineering was identified as a critical attack 
mechanism, which is a rapidly growing security problem that enables threat agents to exploit 
one of the weaknesses present in every organization: the human factor. In spite of the 
existence of some adaptation mechanisms that could improve the security level and minimize 
the impact of these threats, it was found that their implementation could be hindered by the 
lack of policy enforcement or the unreadiness of the involved actors to implement these 
measures. From the VA results it was concluded that in order to address these cybersecurity 
challenges, an integrated assessment consisting of a physical, cyber and social perspective 
should be used. 
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In the second part of this study, a resilience management approach was developed in an 
attempt to give answers to the question of how to prepare cyber-physical power systems to 
the unknown unknowns. The resilience management approach comprise four phases (1) 
Prepare and prevent, (2) Implement robust and precautionary design, (3) Manage and recover 
from crises, and (4) Learn for the future. These phases must be run through iteratively. 
In the proposed strategy, resilience-enhancing measures were sorted by the same categories 
used for the VA and allocated to each phase. The measures were built on the VA results and 
were derived from the expert interviews, literature research and own judgments. The resilience 
management strategy focuses on structuring resilience-enhancing measures which include 
mechanism to prepare for the unexpected, implementation of a precautionary design, 
adaptation mechanisms and the ability of the system to learn for the future. 
In the first phase - Prepare and prevent -, known vulnerabilities and weak points must be 
identified and effective preventive measures must be implemented. For instance, the 
implementation of authentication and encryption at endpoints, performing backups of the 
control and program logic, reducing the services to only the necessary ones and developing 
better guidelines. Besides, adequate cyber security regulation frameworks should be 
established and its implementation should be effectively monitored. In the second phase, the 
focus shifts to implementing a robust and precautionary design. The main focus here is using 
and applying resilience design principles such as diversification of components and protocols, 
establishing redundant and modular structures and communications, and implementing 
anomaly detection systems, amongst other. If the above measures fail and the system is 
subjected to stress, e.g., as the result of a successful attack, it is necessary to manage the 
crisis by restraining it to the smallest possible area or subsystem and recover the system 
services as quickly as possible. This leads to the third phase of the resilience management 
strategy which is the provision of adaptation mechanisms. In order to manage and recover 
from crises, the system’s architecture should be flexible, e.g., through a cellular structure with 
multi-agent-based control with decentralized consensus. Additionally, offline physical backups 
should be built to provide better security and ICT independent recoveries in cases of 
successful attacks. For the last phase – Learn for the future - suitable measures include 
establishing a vulnerability store, in which identified weaknesses are documented along with 
a solution store, in which strengths in avoided failures from the past are recorded. This 
information should be shared between organizations in order to learn from incidents or near 
misses. 
The resilience-enhancing measures are summarized in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 of 
section 5.5. The suggested measures do not intend to be comprehensive and it can be seen 
that for some phases or categories not many measures have been derived. For instance, for 
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the ‘manage and recover’ and ‘learn for the future’ phases, as well as ‘the human factor’ and 
‘regulations’ categories, only few measures are proposed, although these phases are highly 
relevant for a resilient behavior of the system. We therefore conclude that more effort has to 
be put into finding adequate measures for these phases and categories taking non-
technological and organizational aspects into consideration.  
Regarding the applied methodologies, we consider that the vulnerability assessment approach 
was straight forward, easy to apply and can successfully deliver results, however, it can be 
time consuming. Whereas deriving the resilience management strategy was a more 
challenging process. The results from the VA and the resilience design-principle-theory 
supported the definition of measures for phase one and two. However, for the other two 
phases, which are strongly related to resilience building and are not included in traditional risk 
management approaches, it was challenging to give generalized advice that would help to 
mitigate any kind of stress. This is reflected on the limited measures listed for these phases.  
We consider that the use of resilience principles and elements, as well as the establishment 
of a resilience management approach can support stakeholders and users on preparing the 
evolving power systems for the unexpected. However, further work is needed to proof this 
assumption and to improve the knowledge in this area. We therefore propose that the next 
steps should be to implement the suggested measures described in this manuscript, monitor 
the behavior of systems under stress and iteratively add further measures for the different 
phases. Procedures and results should be documented and openly accessible, thus making 
it possible for joint contributions and for learning from previous experiences. This will enable 
a continuous improvement of the resilience management strategy, as well as the knowledge 
of resilience itself. 
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Appendix A: Interview Analysis Methodology 
Expert interviews 
To gain adequate data from relevant sources in the field, expert interviews were chosen as 
the optimal method to generate data (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). The aim was to find interview 
partners whose long-term expertise in the IT or energy sector can provide a well-founded 
overview of relevant topics in the field. In the end, 19 interviews were conducted with experts 
from IT, energy, and automation fields, and public bodies. Each of those interviews were 
conducted in English, transcribed and then further analyzed based on (Mayring, 2014). 
Questionnaire 
The questions used for the semi-structured interviews are listed below: 
 Professional information  
1. What is your educational and professional background? 
2. Which job position do you have at the moment? Since when? 
3. Could you describe your current job position? 
3.1. How is it related to smart grids? 
3.2. How is it related to smart grid cyber security? 
4. Are you involved in any R&D project on cyber security of smart grids in your 
organization? 
4.1. If yes, could you briefly describe it? 
Knowledge about studies on cyber security in Smart Grids and risk assessment  
5. Several standards, guidelines and recommendations have been addressing smart 
grid cyber security and risk assessment in particular. One example is the report 
developed by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): 
“Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security (NIST-IR 7628)”. 
5.1. Are you familiar with some of these initiatives?  
5.2. Do you know about any other study dealing with smart grid cyber security 
issues in Germany, Europe and/or worldwide? 
5.2.1. If yes, could you name and briefly describe them?  
Cyber security vulnerabilities in Smart Grids  
Considering the following smart grid reference architecture model *(see (IEC, 2020)) 
and assuming a complete implementation of the smart grid functionalities:  
6. In your opinion, which are the main cyber security challenges for the smart grid 
that need to be addressed? Why? 
7. In the reference architecture model, could you identify which components (power 
equipment or information assets) are potentially most vulnerable? 
7.1. Which of them represent special interest in your field of expertise?  
7.2. For what reasons? 
8. Which are the perturbations / events that could have an effect on the system 
services? 
9. What could be the potential impacts from these perturbations/events? 
10. Which are the relevant stressors / aggressors for the occurrence of these 
perturbations / events? 
a) people 
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d) others: please name 
11. What conditions in each of the following fields facilitate the occurrence of these 





12. In case of intentional perturbations, what is the feasibility of putting these 
perturbations / events in practice, either in present or in future power systems?  
12.1. What would be the attack mechanisms? 
13. What is required or has to be modified in order to prevent the occurrence of these 
intentional or unintentional perturbations / events?  
14. What are the existing (or prospective) adaptation options to recover the system 
services?  
14.1. What could be done on the technical and organizational level for such 
a recovery?  
15. How can we learn from past events and from the so called “near misses”? 
16. When and to what extent can the identified adaptation measures be implemented?  
17. Who are the actors and institutions involved in the development and regulation of 
the implementation of these adaptation options? From: 
• energy sector 
• IT sector 
• regulatory authorities 
• the market 
System Granularity  
Considering the evolution of the power systems, in terms of production, consumption 
and control, which goes from a totally centralized system towards a more granular or 
decentralized system: 
18. How would the granularity of the system affect the exposition and sensitivity to the 
previous perturbations identified? 
19.  How would the granularity of the system affect the identified measures to cope 
with them? 
 
Overview of content analysis methodology 
The main focus of the qualitative content analysis methodology is to construct a code system, 
which is systematically derived out of the interview data while working along a set of 
methodological rules (Mayring, 2014). Qualitative content analysis put an emphasis on 
constructing and founding codes based on the data from previously conducted expert 
interviews (Mayring, 2014). Code systems are both starting point and result of the first 
analytical steps while contributing to the reliability of this methodological approach. As this 
methodology is also very theory driven, these codes serve as theoretical categories, oriented 
on thematic aspects of the data, prior knowledge and previous studies. These codes were 
filled with text passages from the material, which contain relevant content, matching the 
thematic orientation or the topic of the categorical code. More information about the coding 
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process, which addresses open coding as analytical tool (Mayring, 2014), is provided in the 
next section.  
It is also important to include current research and theoretical aspects in every step of the 
content analysis (Mayring, 2014). In this project, the results of both literature review and 
vulnerability assessment methodology, including the ideas behind this method took a 
significant part in conducting the content analysis. Another criterion for content analysis is 
objectivity. This can be achieved by the inter-coder reliability which is a research tool designed 
to compare the codes from different researchers and look for differences in the way the content 
was coded. This tool affords multiple researchers and addresses the problems of site 
boundary and too different interpretations of the text material (Mayring, 2014). Furthermore, 
an exact determination of the basic data material in use, as well as its origin has to be 
regarded. The basic material which has to be analyzed can consist out of every linguistic data, 
pictures and even videos. The most common source of data is presented in form of transcribed 
interviews (Mayring, 2014). After the determination of a precise research issue, the rest of the 
analytical process has to be agreed upon. During this, analytical steps can vary depending on 
the research topic and the chosen special method of a content analysis (Mayring, 2014). 
Those special techniques focus on different forms of processing textual data: structuring, 
explication and summarization.  
For this project, the technique of summarization was chosen. The goal here was to reduce the 
initial material while keeping the main content and meaning intact. The standard 
summarization procedure proposed by (Mayring, 2014) which was used in this study, will be 
shortly described:  
• After an initial coding, the coded text passages were paraphrased in order to reach a 
consistent linguistic level. Here, the initial text material was reduced for the first time, 
as the passages which were transcribed as they were spoken were transformed to 
grammatical abbreviations. The main content and structure were still maintained in 
those paraphrases while unimportant elements which do not contain meaning or 
relevant contents were deleted (Mayring, 2014).  
• After paraphrasing, the material was condensed once more. For this step, the level of 
abstraction was agreed upon to edit those paraphrases. Everything under the desired 
level was kept for further abstraction and generalization, anything above that level was 
kept as it was. Paraphrases with the same content were integrated and those 
containing no relevant meaning were left out (Mayring, 2014).  
• In a second round of summarization, paraphrases were integrated into each other. In 
this way, categories on the desired level of abstraction were generated. In combination 
with this, a preliminary system of categories including summaries for each relevant 
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topic was derived from the material. Following this, it was checked if the basic material 
was still represented accordingly by reviewing the initial code system, categories and 
paraphrases. If the representation of the initial data was satisfying, the summaries 
were further reduced and integrated until the desired level of concentration was 
achieved (Mayring, 2014). 
Concerning the construction of the code system, the methodology proposes that this could be 
done in different ways: either inductive, deductive or as a mixture of both. Inductive 
construction means that a code system will not be existing when stating the coding process. 
Instead, it will emerge out of the data during the coding process and the successive bundling 
of the material. Codes are generated directly through the material by first deriving selective 
criteria concerning the desired level of abstraction and then, selecting content which is 
relevant for the topic of interest. The research issue should be kept in mind at this step. During 
the coding, the material will be viewed completely and codes are constructed and filled with 
coding. Another round of checking and revisiting the codes after the first round of coding will 
be necessary, to have all codes coded with the whole material (Mayring, 2014). 
Deductive construction of codes implies starting off with a previously generated code system 
which take into account all the theoretical background, literature reviews and the research 
topic. This preliminary code system will then undergo the processes of coding and 
summarizing as described above (Mayring, 2014).  
The last way of generating codes is deductive-inductive. It combines the advantages of a 
preliminary code system, constructed alongside the theoretical background, research 
hypothesis and previous knowledge with the advances of revisiting, reviewing and reworking 
the code system during the coding process (Mayring, 2014). This method was chosen to be 
the right starting point in this study, as the elements of the VA could be used as codes for the 
first code system. Then the statements from expert interviews were categorized by those 
codes and then reviewed accordingly. 
To meet the demands of this interdisciplinary and mixed methods project, the standard 
procedure of content analysis had to be altered. Therefore, the process of paraphrasing and 
reducing was shortened as the experts’ statements were very specific and thematically 
focused. This led to larger text segments being coded. These segments were then 
paraphrased keeping a focus on the delivered meaning in order to achieve a constant level of 
articulation. But instead of transforming the segments of direct speech into abbreviations, 
whole sentences were constructed to keep the structure of arguments intact and to prepare 
them for later summarizations. The paraphrases then underwent a round of checking by every 
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researcher, in order to make sure that content and meaning were correctly extracted and 
condensed. 
With those more comprehensive paraphrases, the first summaries were constructed for the 
VA methodology. The reason for choosing paraphrases which were in full sentences and more 
comprehensive was so that it would be easier distinguish between statements from different 
experts.  
Later on, as the phases for the resilience strategy were developed and included in the code 
system the material was once more coded with these new categories and paraphrased. Those 
paraphrases were also summarized to achieve a comprehensive text from every major code. 
These summaries include different statements which were unbundled and reduced as 
described above. 
The paraphrased statements from the coding system were ordered by their topic. Statements 
concerning the same topic but from different interviewees were integrated into each other. 
Emphasis was laid on keeping the specific structure and meaning of statements intact, so that 
it can be differentiated between statements of different experts. 
Coding content 
In this section, the process of open coding will be described in more detail to show how 
documents were initially analyzed and thus prepared for the content analysis methodology. 
Open coding based on the Grounded Theory methodology is very well suited to open a 
material in an early analysis phase and for forming the first categories. This is done by 
classifying, conceptualizing and categorizing the original data (Strauss and Corbin, 2010). 
Through constant comparison during the process, the data is given specificity and precision 
during which questions are also posed to the material - what is conveyed, how is it expressed, 
why was that very word chosen, in what context is the passage described, what is the meaning 
conveyed? (Strauss and Corbin, 2010). Thus more and more concepts are gradually being 
determined from the data, which are then combined into groups from which phenomena can 
be derived (Strauss and Corbin, 2010). The concepts must therefore be appropriately named. 
This can either be done by yourself, or by in vivo codes that are derived directly from the text 
passage and adopted (Strauss and Corbin, 2010). After concepts and phenomena have been 
derived, the first categories are created which contain dimensionalities and reflect the 
properties of the concepts they contain (Strauss and Corbin, 2010). 
There are different methods for open coding. Thus, the material can be viewed line by line, or 
even more precisely, word by word. This is the most detailed and at the same time most 
effective approach since the largest possible number of categories can be filtered out of a text 
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(Strauss and Corbin, 2010). This is particularly important in early analysis phases in order to 
generate a wealth of categories which can be checked and revised in the further procedure.  
The next coding method focuses on the text passages per sentence or paragraph. Here the 
main ideas of sections are filtered out and compared with the other concepts. This is 
particularly suitable if some categories already exist and are to be encoded in their thematic 
environment (Strauss and Corbin, 2010).  
A third approach is to consult entire documents. The main aim is to identify differences to other 
documents or to differentiate the overall context of the document (Strauss and Corbin, 2010). 
According to this, open coding leads in a special way to deal with the source material in order 
to derive first theoretical building blocks in the form of categories filled with content. This is 
precisely why the method is suitable for analyzing interview data for its content and 
categorizing it in such a way that further analysis steps can follow. 
Another way to code documents is axial coding. Content analysis affords this step after an 
initial round of coding, to check data with a focus on an existing code system. But it is also 
possible, to conduct only axial coding, if a preexisting code system has to be validated. This 
is important, to ensure that existing codes are sufficient as relevant categories and contain 
enough meaning. The material is viewed alongside the code systems and is constantly 
compared with it. Keeping strictly focused on existing codes to enhance and fill them is 
especially needed when a preexisting code system is used. In this case, the first round of 
coding makes sure that existing codes are sufficient, otherwise new ones have to be created. 
A second round of coding makes sure that all documents are included in the newer codes and 
confirms if existing codes are still in the right categories. After completing the second round of 
coding, the code system should be more precise and structured. If not, additional rounds of 
coding and recoding can be conducted, until a satisfactory level of structuration and saturation 
is reached (Mayring, 2014). 
The following describes the coding process performed in this study: 
• Text segments from the interview transcription were coded with categories which 
contained a specific topic mentioned. Those topics could be: general information about 
professional information, or it could be content that was relevant for categories of the 
VA or for the resilience strategy. The whole text segment containing a specific topic 
was sorted into the respecting category. 
• The first round of coding combined perks of open coding with the focus of an axial 
coding.  
• Like open coding, new codes were derived out of the material and the material was 
initially broken up into coding. Axial coding with the preliminary code system (Table 8) 
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ensured, that codes in this code system were filled accordingly, thus gaining reliability 
and validity. 
• It also was important, that every researcher in charge of the content analysis had 
completed a full round of coding, including all documents. After this, the code system 
underwent a complete run of recoding by every researcher. During this step, every 
coding inside of a code was reviewed with a focus on checking the following points: 
(a) if coding belongs to the right code, or whether more structuring was needed, (b) if 
the code still conveys its initial thematic orientation, (c) if enough content was 
conveyed by the code in order to keep it a category or (d) if the code has to be a sub-
code of another major code. 
• The research team together revisited the resulting code system, which underwent 
major changes during this analytical step as it was decided to change the structure 
and to include the phases of the resilience strategy and some structuring for parts 
concerning elements of the VA. With this new code system, another round of coding 
and recoding followed. 
The resulting code system (Table 9) proved to be reliable to capture the content, which was 
delivered by interviewed experts. 
Table 8 Initial code system derived from the expert interview and workshops 
List of codes 
Code system 
  Working domain 
  Challenges 
  Open category 
  Professional and educational background 
    Current job position 
  Research project 
  Regulations 
  Vulnerable assets 
    Human resources 
      Administrative staff 
      Electrical Operators 
      IT operators 
    Cyber infrastructure assets 
    Electrical infrastructure assets 
  Perturbations 
    External perturbation 
    Internal perturbation 
  Potential impacts 
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    Cyber infrastructure 
      Confidentiality 
      Non-repudiation 
      Availability 
      Integrity 
    Electrical infrastructure 
      Power outages 
        Large power outage 
        Small power outage 
      Qualitative Criteria 
        Indirect Parameters 
          Public acceptance 
          Economic impacts 
        Impacts on technical parameters 
  Stressors 
    Other 
    Hazards 
      Degradation 
      Human errors 
    Organizations 
    People 
      External stressor (P) 
      Internal stressor (P) 
  Conditions 
    Other 
    Society 
    Regulations (conditions) 
    Economy 
    Organization 
    Technology 
  Attack mechanisms 
  Feasibility 
    Motivation 
    Level 
    Effort 
    Knowledge 
  Adaptation strategies 
    Preparation 
      Challenges (Prep) 
    Prevention 
      Challenges (Prev) 
    Detection 
      Challenges (Det) 
    Response 
      Challenges (Resp) 
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    Recovery 
      Challenges (Rec) 
    Learning 
      Challenges (Lear) 
  Implementation of adaptation strategies 
    Willingness to implement 
    Readiness to implement 
  Actors involved 
    Market 
    Others 
    Regulatory authorities 
    IT sector 
    Energy sector 
  Granularity of the system 
    Low granularity 
    High granularity 
Table 9 Final code system that captures the content delivered by interviewed experts and was used for the 
assessment of vulnerabilities and for deriving resilience-enhancing measures 
Final list of codes 
Code system 
  New Categories 
    Insecure communications 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Insecure End-Points 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Insecure interface between components of different vendors 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    improper change and configuration management 
      Incorrect settings damage the system or allow to get access 
      Software and firmware allows unauthorized modification 
        Exposure and Sensitivity 
        Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
        Potential impacts 
        Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Systems running in web services 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
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      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Lack of “expert” operators 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Lack of IT-OT experts in the organization 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Improper network segregation 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Improper security patch management 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Lack of effective implementation of security standards 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Lack of security awareness in the organizations 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    Lack of security awareness among consumers 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    No economic incentives to invest / lack of coordinated effort 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Attack mechanism and Perturbations 
      Potential impacts 
      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
    System malfunctions 
      Exposure and Sensitivity 
      Potential impacts 
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      Adaptation strategies, implementation 
  Failure scenarios 
  Resilience Strategies 
    Implementation of adaptation strategies 
      Willingness to implement 
      Readiness to implement 
    Challenges for Resilience 
      Challenges (Prep) 
      Challenges (Prev) 
      Challenges (Det) 
      Challenges (Resp) 
      Challenges (Rec) 
      Challenges (Lear) 
    Adaptation strategies 
      Prepare and prevent 
        Preparation 
        Prevention 
      Implementation of robust and precautionary design 
        Detection 
      Manage and recover from crisis 
        Response 
        Recovery 
      Learn for the Future 
        Learning 
    Granularity of the system 
      Failures and Malfunctions 
      Attacks and Impacts 
      Security Solutions and Response Mechanisms 
      Cells and Micro Grids 
      Centralized Architectures 
      Decentralized Architectures 
  General Codes 
    Actors involved 
    Open category 
    Challenges 
    Regulations 
  Experts Information and Research Projects 
    Research project 
    Professional and educational background 
    Working domain 
 
